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TAKING FREE EXERCISE
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
Alan Brownsteint
INTRODUCTION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides little if
any protection to religious individuals or institutions against neutral
laws of general applicability. That was the holding of Employment
Division v. Smith' in 1990. The Supreme Court has not done anything
over the last fifteen years to significantly modify or mitigate this doc-
trinal rule.2 Thus, under current constitutional authority, the political
branches of government may freely ignore the impact of their laws
and administrative decisions on religious practices and religiously
motivated conduct. The courts have no mandate to intervene unless
government targets religion and singles it out for unfavorable regula-
tory treatment.3
t Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of Law. B.A. Antioch College;
J.D., Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Thomas Berg, Richard Garnett, Eric
Grant, Robert Mikos, and Laura Underkuffier for reading drafts of this article and providing
helpful comments and criticism. I also want to thank Professor Robert Lawry and the faculty at
Case Law School for inviting me to deliver the William A. Brahms Lecture on Law and Relig-
ion on March 30, 2006 at the Case School of Law. Part of this article served as the basis of that
lecture.
I 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In the words of one scholar, after Smith, "generally applicable
laws alleged to burden the exercise of religion . . . invariably will [withstand] constitutional
attack." PETER K. ROFES, THE RELIGION GUARANTEES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 163 (2005). See also James E. Woods, Jr., Government Intervention in
Religious Affairs: An Introduction, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND
REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 10 (James E. Woods, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1993)
("Without any real basis for exemption given to the free exercise of religion, the majority opin-
ion in Smith gives to the state the right to force compliance with all its valid laws without any
balancing of the claims of the free exercise of religion with a compelling state interest.").
2 The only other free exercise case the Court has reviewed since Smith, Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), acknowledged and applied existing
precedent. It did not modify the Smith holding or analysis. Further, in striking down a federal
statute attempting to expand the protection provided to religious liberty in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court essentially reaffirmed the very limited understanding of
free exercise rights that it had adopted in Smith.
3 Smith, 494 U.S. 877-79 (holding that while a state cannot prohibit acts or abstentions
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The Smith decision received a torrent of criticism. Many church-
state scholars denounced it.4 Congress, and several state legislatures,
responding to the Court's apparent abdication of its constitutional
responsibilities regarding religion, enacted legislation to protect reli-
gious freedom more rigorously than the truncated version of the First
Amendment adopted by the Court.5 Underlying the academic and
political reaction to Smith was a common theme. By limiting judicial
review to only those situations in which the government discriminates
against religious beliefs or practices, and refusing to protect religious
activities against substantial burdens imposed by neutral and general
laws, the Court was not taking religious liberty seriously. This was
not the way that courts were supposed to go about the business of
enforcing constitutional guarantees. The correct way to affirm and
protect religious liberty, according to the critics of Smith, was for
courts to strictly scrutinize any law or administrative decision that
substantially burdened the exercise of religion.
6
solely because of their religious significance, "an individual's religious belief [does not] excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate").
4 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Ab-
normalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77 (2000); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the
Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995). The criticism
continues. See RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT? SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 162 (2d ed. 2005) ("[T]he Court in Smith, in the name of
judicial passivity, abdicated its role as defender of minority or unpopular religious groups by
abandoning the compelling interest test, relegating the Free Exercise Clause to the extreme
margins of constitutionally guaranteed liberties, and exposed minority religions to the vagaries
of legislative bodies-majoritarianism with a vengeance.").
5 See FLOWERS, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that critics of Smith petitioned Congress
to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in order to "restore the 'compelling state inter-
est test' as the methodology courts used for adjudicating free exercise cases"); ROFES, supra
note I, at 157-59 (discussing Congress's efforts to "obliterate" the Smith decision through
legislation); Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) (noting that the only thing
that the diverse critics of Smith could agree on when formulating congressional legislation was
the need to subject all laws that substantially burdened religious practice to rigorous review).
See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000); Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to 42-80.1-4 (1998); Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-21 (1993).
6 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act itself explicitly states that the purpose of the
Act is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(l). Nu-
merous commentators agreed that such rigorous review was necessary and appropriate. See, e.g.,
Angela C. Carmella, The Religion Clauses and Acculturated Religious Conduct: Boundaries for
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Debate surrounding the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
today remains fixated on these two opposing, but equally simplistic
and inflexible constitutional formulas. One side argues that the Free
Exercise Clause means nothing more than protection against deliber-
ate persecution.7 The other side insists that there is only one way to
take religious freedom seriously as a constitutional matter: any state
action substantially burdening religion must be justified as necessary
to the furtherance of a compelling state interest.
8
I have no doubt that Smith was wrongly decided. It is less clear to
me that the only way for courts to take religious liberty seriously is by
a blanket commitment to strict scrutiny review of all laws that sub-
stantially burden the exercise of religion.9 Certainly, constitutional
doctrine in other areas of law is not limited to the bare choice of ei-
ther protecting a right rigorously in all cases, or not protecting it at all.
When the scope of a right extends broadly so that its protection impli-
cates varying and important state interests, taking the right seriously
does not mean we must always protect the right under rigorous re-
view. Rather, it means that courts must develop a nuanced, complex,
and sophisticated jurisprudence regarding the right. Doctrine must be
carefully crafted in a way that respects both the right and the state
interests that conflict with its exercise.
Freedom of speech is an obvious example. Everyone recognizes
that American courts do and should take freedom of speech seriously.
But no one argues that courts must adjudicate free speech claims un-
der a unitary, one-size-fits-all-cases, standard of review. Free speech
the Regulation of Religions, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND REGULATING
RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 39-40 (James E. Woods, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1993); Stephen L.
Carter, Comment, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 118, 139-41
(1993); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv. 221,
231-33; Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 254 (1995).
7 While doctrinal debate regarding the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is focused on
two competing rules, I do not mean to suggest that the proponents of either rule agree on the
reasons underlying their position. Some proponents of the holding in Smith, for example, are
concerned about the consequences or fairness of providing religious individuals exemptions
from generally applicable laws. See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL 293-95
(2005); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308, 319-23 (1991). Other scholars may reject constitutionally mandated exemptions on
the basis of history and the original understanding of the constitutional text. See, e.g., Philip A.
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: A Historical Perspective, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 915, 936-46 (1992).
8 See supra note 6.
9 See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Exercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne:
Charting a Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105, 109 (1998) ("[An] 'almost everything or almost
nothing' approach to the Free Exercise Clause is neither necessary nor desirable.").
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doctrine requires courts to consider a variety of factors including the
nature of the state action or regulation at issue, 0 the kind of speech
being restricted," and the location where speech occurs 12 in order to
determine which of a range of possible standards of review is appro-
priate in any given circumstance.
Other constitutional guarantees may not reach the level of com-
plexity of free speech doctrine, but their adjudication involves at least
some internal distinctions. Certainly this is true for equal protection
guarantees 13 or the freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
10 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 797 (1989) (holding that content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 316-21 (1988) (holding that content-based regulation "must be subject to the most
exacting scrutiny").
11 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
561, 563-65 (1980) (holding that content-based regulation of commercial speech will be subject
to a less exacting standard of review than is applied to content discriminatory regulations of
other kinds of speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (recognizing that "obscene
material is unprotected by the First Amendment" and can be suppressed by government); Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (suggesting that fighting words "which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are not
protected by the First Amendment).
12 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992) (holding
that regulations of speech in a nonpublic forum such as an airport terminal that do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of viewpoint will be upheld as long as they are reasonable); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479 (1987) ("To ascertain what limits, if any, may be placed on protected speech,
we have often focused on the 'place' of that speech, considering the nature of the forum the
speaker seeks to employ.").
13 For example, we apply equal protection principles to some fundamental rights but not
others-with varying degrees of rigor. The Court applied strict scrutiny under an equal protec-
tion analysis to strike down a poll tax that limited access to the right to vote in Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Court also employed an equal protection
analysis to protect the right to travel, but here, the level of review applied has been inconsistent.
Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (indeterminate balancing test) with Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (strict scrutiny). The Court has been less interested in equal
protection concerns when it evaluates burdens on privacy and autonomy rights. See, e.g., Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578 (2003) (avoiding equal protection implications of its
decision to strike down anti-sodomy laws as a violation of substantive due process); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980) (upholding law that denies funding for abortions for
indigent women).
With regard to the review of classifications based on personal characteristics, courts also
draw numerous distinctions. Racial classifications receive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). Gender discrimination receives intermediate level
scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). Age classifications receive
rational basis review. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976). The list could go on.
Further, even within a particular classification category, important doctrinal distinctions
are recognized. Compare Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (suggesting that state
laws barring non-citizens from government jobs that involve discretionary decision-making
authority over citizens are reviewed under highly deferential, rational basis review) with Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (stating that state laws discriminating against
non-citizens with regard to their access to welfare benefits are reviewed under strict scrutiny).
Nor is it clear that the Court applies the same standard of review with equal rigor in all equal
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zures. 14 Given the relative depth of doctrine in these other areas of
constitutional law, why should anyone assume that a doctrinal
framework adequate to adjudicate freedom of religion conflicts
should be limited to a single, simple formula-whether it is a rule that
provides no protection against neutral laws of general applicability or
one that requires the rigorous review of all laws that substantially
burden religious exercise? Or to ask the question more bluntly-why
would anyone think that courts take religious liberty seriously when
they reduce issues as complex as those relating to religious liberty in
a religiously diverse society to a single rule of decision making?
The goals of this essay are interrelated and modestly ambitious. I
hope to lay out a foundation for thinking about free exercise doctrine
seriously. Of course, at best, this can only be a sketch of what a full
doctrinal framework might look like. Constitutional doctrine evolves
incrementally. It does not spring fully formed out of the heads of law
professors or judges. It would be absurd to imagine anyone sitting
down and drafting contemporary free speech doctrine from scratch.
The same is true for free exercise doctrine. Thus, the purpose of this
essay is to initiate a discussion, not to present a finished model.
More specifically, this article is not going to attempt to resolve the
question of how rigorously courts should review laws that regulate
religious conduct in different circumstances. Its focus is more basic
than that. The problem it seeks to resolve is whether meaningful doc-
protection cases. Benign and remedial racial classifications and invidious racial classifications
materially disadvantaging racial minorities may both receive strict scrutiny review. But the
Court has emphasized that the former classification is less constitutionally problematic than the
latter. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-30 (1995) (explaining that
while strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for both invidious and remedial race-
based classifications, in applying that standard the Court may take into account the difference
between "'an engine of oppression' and an effort 'to foster equality in society').
14 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, (1967) (recognizing that at least
some Fourth Amendment exceptions are determined by "balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails"); MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES 34 (2d ed. 2003) ("Modern search and seizure law is astoundingly complex and
contradictory ... . A partial list [of 'exceptions' to the warrant requirement] would include
exigent circumstances (such as flight or destruction of evidence), the direct observation of
crime, plain view, open fields, community caretaker functions, brief investigative stops, brief
frisks for weapons, inventory searches, protective sweeps, automobile searches, border searches,
school searches, prison searches, arrests in public places, searches incident to arrest, fire investi-
gations, and administrative searches."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age
of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987) ("[The Court has balanced in determining the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, the definition of a search, the reasonableness of a search, the
reasonableness of a seizure, the meaning of probable cause, the level of suspicion required to
support stops and detentions, the scope of the exclusionary rule, the necessity of obtaining a
warrant, and the legality of pretrial detention of juveniles.").
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trinal distinctions can be drawn in this area of law. Thus, the goal is to
determine whether distinctions can be drawn that justify the applica-
tion of different levels or standards of review in different circum-
stances in the adjudication of free exercise cases, and to demonstrate
that something other than results-oriented standards such as strict
scrutiny or rational basis review can be meaningfully employed here.
Working out exactly how rigorous judicial review should be in one
context or another is obviously an important part of the project of
developing free exercise doctrine, but it will have to be the substance
of another article.
To be useful, however, even a basic sketch of free exercise doc-
trine must satisfy certain requirements. There are reasons offered to
justify the current, very limited constitutional protection provided to
religious activities. Any projection of a more complex framework has
to confront and respond to those arguments and concerns. The first
part of this essay will summarize the primary rationales presented for
reducing the scope of free exercise protection to the very limited rules
set out in Employment Division v. Smith. Then, the core of the article
will set out a framework for understanding and protecting free exer-
cise rights that avoids or mitigates those concerns.
I. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PROTECTING FREE
EXERCISE RIGHTS
An array of arguments suggests that free exercise rights do not de-
serve careful constitutional attention, 15 or, alternatively, that there are
unavoidable and insurmountable difficulties in developing meaning-
ful free exercise jurisprudence. These arguments can be categorized
as follows: (1) the justification problem, (2) the anomalous treatment
argument, (3) the anarchy problem, (4) the argument against privileg-
ing religion, (5) the balancing problem, and (6) the problem of defini-
tion. Each category warrants some brief explanation and discussion.
A. The Avoidable Problems: Justification, Anomalous Treatment, and
Anarchy
These three arguments can be dispensed with fairly briefly. The
justification problem goes to whether religious liberty deserves any
15 As noted earlier, for those committed to an original intent methodology for interpreting
the Constitution, the question may not be a matter of whether free exercise rights "deserve"
constitutional protection, but rather whether the Constitution authorized courts to protect the
free exercise of religion against neutral laws of general applicability. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
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greater constitutional protection than it receives under the Smith
regime. There is an extensive literature on the justifications for
protecting religious freedom for readers interested in this subject. 16
Readers who doubt the legitimacy or value of protecting religious
liberty should turn to that literature. I will not contribute to that
discussion here, however, because I have little to add to the existing
commentary and the purpose of this article presupposes an affirmative
position on this issue. My goal is to discuss how to take free exercise
rights seriously, not why we should do so. This essay is intended for
an audience that respects religious liberty as a fundamental value but
is uncertain of the efficacy of protecting it through constitutional
law. 17
The anomalous treatment argument is also easily circumvented.
This argument is really a limited challenge to a broadly applied strict
scrutiny regime. The Court in Smith contends that other guarantees
such as the right to freedom of speech and to equal protection of the
laws do not require courts to strictly scrutinize neutral laws of general
applicability that burden speech or result in the incidental disparate
treatment of protected minorities. Therefore, it would be anomalous
to insist on such unusually rigorous review for laws that burden reli-
gious liberty.
18
Whatever the strength or weakness of this argument might be with
regard to a uniformly applied strict scrutiny standard, 19 it is largely
16 See, e.g., JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996); STEVEN D. SMITH,
GETrING OVER EQUALITY-A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA
(2001); Thomas Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (1997);
Alan Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504 (2003); Andrew
Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571; Michael
W. McConnell, Religion and Constitutional Rights: Why Is Religious Liberty the "First Free-
dom?", 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243 (2000); Michael Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good:
Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597 (1997).
17 It is also worth noting that the Court's opinion in Smith does not dispute the value or le-
gitimacy of protecting religious liberty or accommodating religious practice. Its focus is on how
that goal should be accomplished and which branch of government should bear primary respon-
sibility for achieving it. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
18 Id. at 885-86.
19 To the extent that the Smith Court suggested that it would be anomalous to provide the
exercise of religion any constitutional protection against neutral laws of general applicability,
even under more lenient standards of review than strict scrutiny, its argument is exaggerated and
in error. See Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights Genie,
13 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 14-26 (1996); Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The
False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J. L. & POL. 119, 150-65
(2002) [hereinafter False Messiahs]; Gedicks, supra note 4, at 84.
Professor Gedicks turns Justice Scalia's argument about doctrinal anomalies against him.
Gedicks suggests that it would be anomalous not to subject laws that incidentally burden free
exercise rights to some form of intermediate level scrutiny because a similar level of review is
applied to laws that incidentally burden freedom of speech. Gedicks, supra note 4, at 84-88. His
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irrelevant to the doctrinal project I am proposing. The goal of this
article is to create a multifaceted framework for adjudicating free
exercise cases analogous in complexity, although not necessarily par-
allel in content, to free speech and equal protection doctrine. If doc-
trine of that kind can be developed for free exercise rights, almost by
definition, it cannot be criticized as anomalous to other constitutional
areas. Indeed, the goal of this project is to reduce the discrepancy
between free exercise jurisprudence and that of other constitutional
guarantees.
A somewhat similar analysis applies to the so-called anarchy
problem. This is another concern explicitly expressed in Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Smith. Scalia suggests that if courts took
free exercise rights seriously and required exemptions for religious
conduct from neutral laws of general applicability, anyone asserting a
religious basis for their actions could avoid laws and regulations that
they experienced as burdensome. Every person would be "a law unto
himself."
20
This almost apocalyptic prediction of anarchy is predicated on the
presumption that courts cannot reasonably evaluate the merits of free
exercise claims. Underlying this presumption are two implicit conten-
tions. First, there is no way to distinguish one free exercise claim
from another. Second, the balancing of free exercise rights against
important state interests is impossible or illegitimate. 21 Therefore, the
argument goes, we only have two choices; either we refuse to protect
religious exercise against neutral laws of general applicability or we
have to protect all religiously motivated conduct against all but the
most compelling of state interests22-which is a recipe for anarchy.
assumption is that analogous rights should receive roughly similar protection against incidental
burdens.
I am less confident that as a formal matter analogies between the free exercise of religion
and freedom of speech, or analogies between any rights, necessarily justify similar doctrinal
rules. I do agree, however, that the ability and willingness of courts to balance the state's inter-
est in avoiding certain kinds of harms against the individual's interest in freedom of speech
suggests that some form of balancing is possible and justified in free exercise cases. See infra
notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
20 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67
(1878)). See also Loewy, supra note 9, at 105 ("[The [Reynolds] Court concluded that allowing
Reynolds a free exercise defense would 'permit every citizen to become a law unto himself and
practice human sacrifices if they were an essential element of his religious worship.").
21 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. See Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Ex-
emptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 591, 604-08 (1990) (discussing three
reasons why "the courts in deciding who is eligible for exemptions will inevitably make deci-
sions that are arbitrary, unpredictable, and discriminatory").
22 See CATHARINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGIONS 132-33 (2001) ("[Tlhis is the way
[Vol. 57:1
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Thus, the anarchy problem, like the anomalous treatment argument,
assumes that the goal of this article cannot be achieved. No nuanced
free exercise jurisprudence is possible. However, if a doctrinal frame-
work can be developed that allows courts to adjudicate free exercise
claims reasonably and effectively, avoiding the extreme alternatives
postulated in Smith, the anarchy problem no longer exists.
B. The Critical Problems: Privilege, Balancing, and Definition
The remaining three problem areas are critical to the development
of free exercise doctrine. Any framework of analysis has to confront
and respond to these issues if it is to be persuasive. Accordingly, it is
important to fully understand the nature of these concerns so that they
can be adequately taken into account in any proposed adjudicatory
framework.
1. The Problem of Privileging
The problem of privilege includes five related concerns. First,
there is the equity argument. It is simply unfair for government to
treat religious individuals and associations more favorably than indi-
viduals and associations adhering to secular beliefs. If two persons are
hired by a government agency, and they both want to have Saturday
off from work, but the agency's activities require that one of them
must be assigned to work on Saturday, why should a Jewish em-
ployee be given a preference over his secular colleague in obtaining
the desired work schedule in order to accommodate his observance of
the Sabbath? 23 All else being equal, individuals who hold religious
beliefs, or specific religious beliefs, should not receive preferential
treatment. We should all be equal under the law.
To some extent, this form of the privilege problem overlaps the is-
sue of justifying the protection of religious exercise against non-
discriminatory government interference. Arguing that the exercise of
religion should not be privileged resonates with the argument that
there is nothing distinctive about religion that supports providing it
the Court painted the issue in the Smith case: Either the anarchy of the individual religious
conscience would rule, or the government bureaucracy must be left alone to regulate as it deems
necessary for (what Justice Scalia characterized as) society's best interests. There could be no
middle course, because judges would then be faced with the impossible task of 'weigh[ing] the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."').
23 See, e.g., Murphy v. Edge Memorial Hospital, 550 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1982)
(noting that granting Sabbatarian's request for religious accommodation would deprive other
workers of the benefit of a neutral scheduling system).
2006]
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special constitutional protection.24 The overlap is not precise, how-
ever. There are not always similarly situated secular individuals who
might reasonably assert inequitable treatment based on the accommo-
dation provided a religious person. Some exemptions give religious
individuals and associations the opportunity to accept burdens or
avoid benefits in ways that their secular counterparts are unlikely to
desire. Allowing a Seventh-day Adventist school's basketball team to
participate in a basketball tournament with the understanding that
they will lose any game by default that is scheduled on Saturday, their
Sabbath, for example, is unlikely to provoke a long list of teams from
secular schools insisting on similar treatment.25 Under Smith, free
exercise rights may be ignored even when there is no real equity issue
to speak of because the kind of accommodation religious objectors
seek would not be sought after by anyone else. Requests for religious
accommodations can be denied even when they would be perceived
by others as valueless or disadvantageous to their interests.
Second, there is a concern about relative advantages in the market-
place of ideas. Freedom from regulatory interference empowers be-
lief-based institutions and associations. It may facilitate their ability
to communicate their message. If nothing else, it substantially reduces
their costs of operation. A religious institution that is exempt from
various burdensome regulations, for example, has obvious advantages
over secular expressive institutions that are subject to such con-
straints.2 6 Thus, the privileging of religious organizations through
24 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1245, 1248
(1994) (arguing that the privileging of religion is problematic because there is no persuasive
justification for respecting religious convictions more than secular beliefs-although courts may
intervene to insure that minority faiths are treated with "equal regard" and receive the same
benefits provided majoritarian groups); West, supra note 21, at 613-23 (contending that none of
the arguments asserted to justify religious exemptions are persuasive in part because there is
nothing distinctive about religion that justifies privileging its practice).
This article bypasses this debate and presupposes, as the text of the First Amendment
states explicitly, that religion should receive distinctive treatment for constitutional purposes.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. This article addresses the very different problem of
attempting to determine how that distinctive treatment might be appropriately implemented.
2 See Montgomery v. Bd. of Educ., 71 P.3d 94 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
26 See False Messiahs, supra note 19, at 136; Alan Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion
Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neu-
trality Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 243, 247-
51 (1999) [hereinafter Religion Clauses]; Marshall, supra note 7, at 321-23; West, supra note
21, at 601 ("[E]xemptions to certain persons because of their religion or to certain churches may
give those religions or churches an unfair advantage over other religions, secular ideologies,
churches, nonprofit organizations, or businesses with which they compete for members and
money.").
[Vol. 57:1
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exemptions can distort the marketplace of ideas in favor of religious
messages.
Third, exempting religious individuals and institutions from
burdensome regulations reinforces religious commitments. In some
circumstances, these accommodations may even serve as a positive
inducement for individuals to adopt religious beliefs or participate in
religious activities.27 There are numerous examples. Perhaps the most
obvious is the statutory exemption from military service for members
of pacifist faiths.28 Freedom from conscription is a sufficiently
valuable benefit that it may influence religious decisions. Similarly,
exemptions from civil rights laws that permit religious organizations
to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring may have both belief
and behavioral consequences. If the failure of an employee to observe
the tenets of an employer's faith, or an employee's expressions of
doubt about the validity of those beliefs, will result in the loss of a
person's job, this consequence is likely to influence the employee's
thoughts and conduct.29
Fourth, privileging religious individuals and institutions by ex-
empting them from general laws may impose direct harm on third
parties or the general public. The discrimination example described
above applies here as well. Losing one's job because of one's faith, or
lack thereof, is a concrete harm that follows directly from the exemp-
tion of religious employers from civil rights laws prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of religion.3° Other illustrations
27 For examples of positive inducements created by accommodations, see Berg, supra
note 5, at 45-51 and Loewy, supra note 9, at 115-16. These concerns about surplus material
benefits resulting from exemptions have led some commentators who strongly support constitu-
tionally mandated accommodations to suggest that exemptions should be denied in cases where
the granting of an accommodation would make religious individuals "better off relative to others
than they would be in the absence of the government program to which they object." McCon-
nell, supra note 4, at 1145-46. As this article will make clear, I do not believe the denial of the
exemption is the only possible solution to this problem.
28 Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.S. App. § 456(j) (2000) (exempting from con-
scription any persons "who, by reason of their religious training and belief, [are] conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form"); See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-
44 (1970) (interpreting conscientious objector provision broadly to include ethical creeds that
play a similar role in the individual's life as religion plays in the life of a believer); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (offering interpretation of conscientious objector
provision subsequently accepted and applied in Welsh).
29 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340 (1987) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in
WELFARE REFORM AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 219, 235-37 (Derek Davis & Barry
Hankins eds., 1999); Alan E. Brownstein, Evaluating School Vouchers Through a Liberty,
Equality, and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871,909-10 (1999).
30 See supra note 29. See also HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 189-99; Jane Rutherford,
Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimina-
tion Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1085-91 (1996).
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are more dramatic. Exempting religious parents from the obligation to
provide conventional medical care to their children, for example,
places the health and lives of children at risk. Arguably, religion is
unreasonably privileged when its practice is permitted to cause harm
to others.3'
Fifth, and finally, if exemptions from burdensome regulations are
materially beneficial to religious individuals and institutions, a legal
regime mandating such accommodations will confront serious practi-
cal problems. The greater the value of the exemption in material
terms, the more likely it is that some people will assert a sham claim
of religious practice or conviction to obtain it. Given the diversity of
religious beliefs in our society and the reluctance of courts to chal-
lenge the alleged religious nature of beliefs or behavior, privileging
religion creates incentives to manipulate the system through false free
exercise claims.32
2. The Problem of Balancing
The balancing problem also has multiple dimensions to it. Several
of these concerns apply to all constitutional balancing tests. They are
not limited to the balancing of free exercise rights against state inter-
ests. The most common criticism is obvious. Balancing tests, it is
argued, involve the weighing and comparing of incommensurable
interests.33 They require courts to find common denominators that do
not exist. This contention is easily applied to attempts to protect free
exercise rights. There is no way for a court to meaningfully balance
an individual's freedom to practice his faith against the state's interest
in enforcing a particular law. How can the burden an individual ex-
periences in being forced to violate a religious obligation, such as the
requirement not to shave, or to wear religious garb, be measured and
31 See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 31-39; Richard W. Gamett, Taking Pierce Seri-
ously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109,
116-18 (2000). See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-
Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REv. 589, 622 (2000) (explaining that courts are less likely to defer
to religious actors and exempt their practices from regulation when they "perceive third parties
to be at risk of harm").
32 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963); West, supra note 21, at 603-04. See also Berg, supra note 5, at 41-43 (noting
that in evaluating claims for religious accommodation "[tihe threat of cumulative exemptions
comes not only from other sincere religious objectors, but from other persons who could feign
the same objection to get the benefits of exemption").
33 See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 972-76; Richard H. Fallon, The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term: Foreword-Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REv. 54, 79-81
(1997); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 61 (1992).
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compared to the cost to the government of accepting exemptions to its
grooming and dress requirements for state employees, military per-
sonnel, or inmates in prisons? It is as if, to use Justice Scalia's famous
statement about the balancing test employed in Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, the courts must decide "whether a particular line is
longer than a particular rock is heavy." 34
A corollary concern is that balancing decisions are intrinsically
subjective and value-based. Again, this problem applies to balancing
tests in general, and free exercise cases in particular. Since there is no
objective way to weigh the individual's interest in exercising a right
against the state's interest in uniform enforcement of particular regu-
lations, the application of this kind of a standard invites judges to base
their judgments on nothing more than their own values. Indeed, there
really is not any alternative way for judges to resolve these disputes
other than to base their decisions on their personal predilections.35
These subjective choices lack constitutional legitimacy. 36 They also
impose continuing costs on society because of their lack of uniformity
and predictability.
Despite the generic nature of the balancing problem, there is some
sense in which it is magnified or particularly acute when religious
liberty is at issue. Subjectivity may raise special questions of
partiality and favoritism here that are less likely to arise in Dormant
Commerce Clause cases, for example. There is greater reason to be
concerned that federal judges may fail to understand, or will be
unsympathetic to, the unconventional practices of a minority faith
than that they will be predisposed against the laws of a particular
state.37 More important, there is a sense that religion is uniquely an all
or nothing proposition as to which compromises are all but
impossible. There is greater flexibility in reviewing restrictions on the
exercise of other rights. Thus, when balancing tests are used to
3 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
35 See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 985-86; Fallon, supra note 33, at 142-50.
36 Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 972-83, 986 (explaining that when courts engage in bal-
ancing "[a]t work... is some undisclosed scale of social value, one not obviously derived from
the Constitution"); Steinberg, supra note 4, at 296-302; West, supra note 21, at 606-07.
37 This concern is bluntly expressed by Mark Tushnet in his comment that "the pattern [of
cases] is that sometimes Christians win but non-Christians never do." Mark Tushnet, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 381. Other commentators have
recognized the same potential for implicit bias against minority faiths. See, e.g., Thomas L.
Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 967-72 (2004);
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemp-
tion, 40 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 357, 379-80 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Relig-
ion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 711 (1986).
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adjudicate other constitutional guarantees, such as the balancing test
employed to review content-neutral speech regulations, courts may
consider the availability of alternative avenues of communication in
reaching their decision.38  Religious obligations are more
circumscribed in their requirements and less susceptible to such
partial accommodations. They must be performed precisely and
literally.
3. The Problem of Definition
Intrinsic to the enforcement of any constitutional guarantee is the
ability of courts to determine what falls within its scope. Protecting
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or freedom of assembly re-
quires some working definition of what it means to exercise the right.
The same is true for the religion clauses. Defining the exercise of
religion, however, has proven to be particularly difficult.
The courts have never formally defined what constitutes a religion
for constitutional purposes; although, there is case law that discusses
the issue.3 9 Numerous commentators have struggled with the ques-
tion.4° Notwithstanding their efforts, it is fair to say that no attempt to
define religion has won sufficiently wide support to be accepted as
providing the answer to this problem.
This article is not going to resolve this difficult question. I
included it in the list of problems that needed to be addressed in
developing free exercise doctrine only because it is an issue that so
obviously requires a solution that the failure to note its existence
would seem to be an odd omission. It should be noted, however, that
the problem of defining religion is not only an unanswered quandary
for the purposes of this article, it is also a problem for the more
38 See Alan E. Brownstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze,
16 CONST. COMMENT. 101, 118-21 (1999). E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989) (discussing the availability of alternative channels for communication in determining
the constitutionality of speech regulation); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (apply-
ing the same test used in Ward).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (discussing definition of "relig-
ion" in context of conscientious objection to military service); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d
1025 (3rd Cir. 1981) (attempting to determine whether certain ideas constitute a religion in
order to evaluate free exercise claim); Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo.
1994) (discussing what constitutes "religion" for First Amendment purposes); Steinberg, supra
note 4, at 286-90 (describing cases addressing the question of what is religious conduct).
40 See, e.g., BETTE Novrr EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 46-75
(1997); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753
(1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses,
41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1988).
[Vol. 57:1
TAKING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
truncated understanding of the Free Exercise Clause adopted in Smith.
A rule that prohibits discrimination against religious practices has to
have some basis for distinguishing between religious practice and
non-religious activities. Thus, for example, in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,41 a series of ordinances outlawing
the killing of an animal in a "public or private ritual or ceremony"
was struck down as an unconstitutional "religious gerrymander"
directed at suppressing the Santeria religion, an Afro-Cuban faith that
practices animal sacrifice in many of its rites.42 Presumably, a
challenge brought against these ordinances by a non-religious
association engaged in ceremonial animal sacrifices, say a college
fraternity that sacrificed animals as part of its hazing rituals, would
not have presented a viable free exercise claim. But to distinguish
between these two cases, the Court would have to have some basis for
concluding that the Santeria practices were "religious" while the
fraternity ritual was not. Thus, even under the doctrine enunciated in
Smith, the courts cannot avoid the problem of defining religion.
Accordingly, the lack of an acceptable definition is an issue for any
doctrinal model of the Free Exercise Clause, but it is not one that
requires acceptance of the Smith approach as opposed to other more
complex frameworks.43
In addition to the lack of an accepted definition of religion, there is
no clear understanding of what constitutes the exercise of religion.
Since religion permeates the life of devout individuals and influences
so many of their decisions, it is difficult to delineate what involves the
"exercise" of religion and distinguishes it from activities that are
influenced by religious beliefs or membership in a religious
community, but are not covered by the First Amendment." Courts
41 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
42 Id. at 535 (quoting the City of Hialeah's Ordinance 87-7 1).
43 Defining religion is also a problem for courts applying the Establishment Clause. See,
e.g., Alvarado v. San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing whether maintenance
of Azteca statue was a violation of the Establishment Clause); Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs,
827 F.2d 684, 689 (11 th Cir. 1987) (determining whether school textbooks alleged to promote
"secular humanism" violate the Establishment Clause); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 199
(3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a class in Transcendental Meditation was religious in nature and
offering it in public schools violated the Establishment Clause).
44 The connection between religious belief and conduct may often be attenuated. For
example, Jewish law does not directly prohibit eating meat, but many Jewish vegetarians are
certainly influenced by their religious beliefs in their decision not to eat meat. See RABBI JOSEPH
TELUSHKIN, JEWISH WISDOM 449-53 (1994). For a thoughtful inquiry into whether it is possible
to identify and protect the exercise of religion in light of the very individualized understanding of
religious belief and practice in contemporary American culture, see WINFRED FALLERS
SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005). See also EvANs, supra note 40,
at 98-120 (discussing how "religion" should be defined for constitutional purposes).
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have considered various limiting principles, including providing
constitutional protection only to practices and activities that are
central to a religion45 or to obligatory conduct required by one's
faith.46 Both parameters are problematic. The centrality inquiry
requires courts to reach conclusions about the importance of religious
precepts, a task for which they lack expertise and authority.47 The
focus on religious obligations has generated more support in the case
law,48 but it fails to protect conventionally religious, but nonetheless
supernumerary, conduct, including prayer and worship, that can not
easily be excluded from the class of religious exercise. Obviously, not
knowing what constitutes the exercise of religion is a problem for a
broader and more nuanced free exercise jurisprudence because it
opens the door to free exercise claims based on some tangential or
attenuated connection to religious beliefs.49 But again, this issue is
simply beyond the scope of this article.
II. DEVELOPING FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE
A. Avoiding Surplus Privileging of Religion
If the free exercise of religion is going to be taken seriously as a
constitutional matter, the problem of privilege must be addressed.
While that will not be an easy issue to consider, it can be broken
down and analyzed methodically. More important, there are ways to
think about protecting the exercise of religion that substantially miti-
gate this concern in many circumstances.
45 See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 n.31 (3d Cir. 2002) (de-
scribing, but declining to follow, cases that focus on the centrality of religious practices); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-13, 216-19 (1971) (repeatedly emphasizing the importance
and centrality of the Amish beliefs in living apart from the modem world in evaluating their free
exercise claim).
46 See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Ca., 493 U.S. 378, 391-92
(1990); Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 254-56 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that even relig-
iously mandated practices need not be accommodated in the prison context if alternative means
of practicing an inmate's faith are available); St. Bartholomew's Church v. New York, 914 F.2d
348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting church's claim that land use law preventing it from using its
property for commercial purposes to earn income burdened free exercise rights).
47 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (arguing that "centrality" is an
inappropriate factor for consideration because of its inherently subjective nature and because
"Oludging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 'business of
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims"').
48 See supra note 46.
49 This is not as much of a problem under the Smith approach. Presumably a viable free
exercise claim would arise even if the government's regulation was directed at conduct only
indirectly related to religious beliefs or practices if the discriminatory regulation only applied to
conduct that was related, directly or otherwise, to religious beliefs.
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Part of the problem here is that by protecting an individual's right
to exercise his religion, or a religious institution's right to operate its
activities free from state interference, we also allow that individual or
institution to escape burdens or receive benefits that have significant
secular value. Allowing a religious pacifist to avoid conscription
protects his right not to engage in conduct (combat) that his religion
prohibits. But it also exempts him from a serious burden that non-
religious individuals would hope to avoid for purely secular reasons
(escaping the disruption, hardship, and risk of injury or death intrinsic
to military service in time of war). Why should religious citizens in
particular be allowed to avoid this dangerous civic obligation?
Similarly, if public employers exempt religious employees from
having to work on their Sabbath, whether it is Saturday or Sunday,
this accommodation not only permits the religious employees to
observe the Sabbath as their religion dictates, but it also provides
them a significant secular benefit. Weekend days off are prized by
employees for various reasons, not the least of which is that they may
be the only days when an entire family will be able to spend time
together. Why should religious employees be given greater eligibility
to receive this desirable benefit-the opportunity to have weekend
days off to spend with their family?
A similar analysis applies to exemptions for religious institutions.
To cite one simple example, in Catholic Charities of Sacramento,
Inc. v. Superior Court,50 Catholic Charities challenged the application
of the Women's Contraceptive Equity Act (WCEA) to its operations
on free exercise grounds. WCEA required employers providing their
employees health insurance plans, including prescription drug bene-
fits, to include medically prescribed contraceptives within the plan's
coverage. If the federal or state constitution mandated an exemption
for religious organizations, such as Catholic Charities, that could not
comply with this law without violating the religious principles to
which they adhered, these organizations would avoid an expense all
other employers must bear. The cost of the insurance coverage Catho-
lic Charities would avoid might not amount to a great deal of money
in this particular case, but any cost savings constitutes a benefit of
secular value.
It is worth reiterating that the doctrinal issue in these examples is
not the foundational question of why a religious pacifist should re-
ceive different treatment than a secular pacifist. That question goes to
whether the exercise of religion deserves distinctive constitutional
- 85 P.3d 67 (2004).
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protection at all. The analysis here presupposes the legitimacy of pro-
tecting religious liberty. The problem is how free exercise doctrine
should take into account the reality that the granting of exemptions
and accommodations not only protects the right to exercise religion,
but also confers secular benefits on religious individuals-above and
beyond the freedom to practice their faith.
One way to mitigate this concern about privileging religious per-
sons and organizations is to clarify precisely what it is that a constitu-
tionally mandated exemption should provide to the religious objector
and what the state may legitimately require of him, notwithstanding
its commitment to protect the exercise of his faith. More specifically,
a mandatory free exercise exemption may prohibit the state from re-
quiring the religious individual to violate the tenets of his faith, but it
would not prevent the state from taking appropriate action to limit any
surplus secular benefit that might accrue to the religious individual as
a result of such an accommodation. In the context of religious exemp-
tions from military service, for example, this kind of an arrangement
is commonplace. Conscientious objectors are required to perform
alternative service, either serving as medics in the military or in non-
military community service programs.51 Thus, religious pacifists need
not violate the commandments of their faith, and the secular benefit
of being free from compulsory military service is significantly re-
duced by the requirement that they must take several years out of
their lives to perform some kind of community service.
The idea that religious pacifists should do something to make up
for the burden they are escaping has a long historical pedigree. Ini-
tially, it appears to have been more of a request or recommendation
than a requirement.52 Over time, however, it became a formal legal
obligation.
Is such an obligation consistent with the goal of protecting reli-
gious liberty against state interference? In one sense, it seems to con-
flict with the idea that individuals have a right to follow the dictates
of their faith. The conscientious objector is exempted from a law that
would force him to violate his religion's precepts. But the exemption
is conditioned on him giving something of value to the state in re-
51 Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.S. App. § 4560) (2000) (granting approved
conscientious objectors alternatives such as noncombatant services in the military or "such
civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest").
52 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTrrtrION 110-11 (2d ed. 2006) (describing early history of religious exemptions from
military service).
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turn-two years of community service. There seems to be a price
attached to the exercise of his free exercise rights.
As a general matter, that argument must be mistaken. The right to
practice one's religion is still protected. What is being taken into ac-
count is the obligation of citizens to share social costs that must be
borne by the community at large. The religious pacifist has no princi-
pled objection to fairly sharing the costs of government. His faith
prohibits him from participating in one function of government, not
from contributing the value of that participation to some other gov-
ernmental goal. There is secular value in being exempt from military
service. Conscription imposes significant costs on the draftee that the
conscientious objector avoids. Requiirig the performance of alterna-
tive service may be more accurately characterized as the disgorge-
ment of that undeserved secular benefit than as a price to be paid for
the right to practice one's faith.
To clarify this analysis, an analogy might be drawn between free
exercise exemptions and the tort law privilege of private necessity. In
the famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,53 to es-
cape a storm, a steamship remains moored at a wharf by repeatedly
replacing the mooring ropes keeping it secured at the dock-
notwithstanding the damage done to the wharf as the waves smashed
the ship against it during the night. In response to a suit brought by
the wharf owners for damages, the steamship's owners asserted the
privilege of private necessity. They argued that the ship had to stay
securely moored to the wharf to avoid its destruction by the storm.
The court recognized the applicability of the privilege to the facts of
the case, but required the defendant to pay the damages it had caused
to the plaintiff in any event.54
Even though the defendant was required to pay damages, the
court's decision in Vincent did not nullify the core value of the neces-
sity privilege. The ship's captain retained the right to make the choice
to stay moored at the wharf. The purpose of the privilege, to allow the
ship to avoid destruction by the storm, was achieved. The privilege
was never intended to allow the party asserting it to shift the costs
created by the storm entirely on to third parties. That would confer a
surplus benefit on the ship, to which it was not entitled.
Admittedly, this analogy is far from perfect. The focus in Vincent
was on compensating persons whose property was damaged through
the exercise of the privilege, not on the defendant giving up the bene-
53 124N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
5 Id. at 222.
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fits he received by staying docked at the wharf. But Vincent does
demonstrate that courts can distinguish between giving individuals a
completely unfettered choice that they may exercise entirely free from
the equities of the situation or the consequences of their conduct and
guaranteeing individuals a choice conditioned upon equitable consid-
erations and concerns relating to the impact of their decision on oth-
ers. In both cases, the individual is given the opportunity to make a
choice that would otherwise be denied to him as a matter of law. But
the latter form of the privilege limits the meaning of the privilege to
its essential character-the right to save one's life (or ship) by creat-
ing an exemption from the general operation of tort and property
law-and nothing more.
It is in this sense that a similar analysis applies to free exercise
fights. The right may allow the religious individual to avoid comply-
ing with a law that would require him to breach the commandments
of his faith. But the burdens created by such laws do not necessarily
disappear when such exemptions are granted. Often, they will be
shifted to third parties or to the public. Thus, the granting of the ex-
emption may provide secular benefits to religious individuals, to the
relative disadvantage of their secular counterparts. The Constitution
may protect the right of individuals to comply with the dictates of
their faith, but it says nothing about allowing them to escape the bur-
dens government imposes on citizens to further the public good, or
providing them more than their fair share of the benefits provided by
government.
The idea of alternative service, or more generically, reducing the
surplus secular benefit of religious exemptions, extends far beyond
conscientious objection to military service. It can apply to the other,
previously discussed, exemptions as well. With regard to an accom-
modation that allows public employees to have a weekend day off to
observe their Sabbath, more than likely, there is some monetary value
that roughly approximates the value to government workers in a par-
ticular field and location of having a weekend day off. In basic terms,
leaving religion out of the equation for the moment, this would repre-
sent the price one employee would demand from another to trade a
weekend day off for a midweek day off. Employers might give reli-
gious workers the choice of having a weekend day off permitting
them to observe their Sabbath with the understanding that their sala-
ries would be reduced by the secular value of that day off (perhaps a
reduction in salary from $1000 per week to $950 per week). Those
workers required to give up a weekend day off, which they would
otherwise have been entitled to under seniority rules or other work-
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force policies, in order to accommodate their religious colleagues,
would have their salaries supplemented by an equivalent amount (for
the purposes of this hypothetical, $50). 5
A similar analysis might apply in the Catholic Charities case.
Catholic Charities might be exempt from the WCEA provision requir-
ing it to add medical contraceptive coverage to its employees' health
plan. It would be required, however, to contribute an amount equal to
the cost of the medical contraceptive coverage either to its employees
(who would not receive the benefit of the WCEA), or to the state, or
to some other public purpose the state might designate. Religious
organizations would not be permitted to benefit financially from the
exemption they sought.56 The constitutionally mandated accommoda-
tion they received would be limited to protecting their ability to com-
ply with the dictates of their faith.
In theory, reducing the surplus secular benefits resulting from
religious exemptions mitigates, although it will not entirely eliminate,
several of the privilege problems discussed earlier. If religious
individuals receiving exemptions from burdensome laws are required
to accept some offsetting, alternative burden that serves important
state interests, the incentive to adopt beliefs entitling one to such an
exemption is correspondingly reduced. Conscientious objector status
is less alluring with an alternative service requirement than without
one. Similarly, a public employee is less likely to assert a sham
religious basis for avoiding weekend work if the resulting
accommodation results in a reduction in his salary. The equity
argument is also muted to some extent. If the employee receiving a
weekend day off to enable him to observe the Sabbath receives a
lower salary, and the secular employee required to take on weekend
-5 In some cases, reducing the surplus secular benefit of a religious exemption may con-
front the religious individual with a difficult decision. An employee receiving a low salary may
find it difficult to accept even a modest reduction in his salary. In that circumstance, reducing
the secular benefits of an exemption, in effect, will deter the religious individual from exercising
his right to an exemption. There is no easy way to completely avoid this possible consequence.
But there may be ways to circumvent or mitigate it, at least to some extent. Perhaps the em-
ployee seeking an exemption could be offered the choice of working a few extra hours without
pay in lieu of receiving a reduced salary. It is probably also the case that the secular value of
having a weekend day off (that is, the cost of purchasing rights to a weekend day off from a co-
worker) is correspondingly lower for low-income employees.
56 One might argue that the benefits society accrues from the work of religious institu-
tions, and religious charities in particular, already offsets any financial benefits they might
receive from an exemption similar to the one sought by Catholic Charities from the WCEA. See
infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text. The point is not entirely without merit, but it raises
significant issues about whether and when such offsets should be presumed. It also undermines
some of the advantages of avoiding surplus secular benefits-such as limiting sham claims and
mitigating inducements towards religious belief and practice.
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
work gets a higher salary, the degree to which the religious employee
is "favored" is sharply limited.
Translating that theory into doctrine is a much more difficult
proposition. An anti-privileging approach to accommodations re-
quires the government to participate in working out the ways that the
surplus secular benefits of religious exemptions may be reduced. But
in many circumstances, the government is disinclined to grant the
exemption in the first place. Thus, a religious public employee who is
denied a weekend day off to observe the Sabbath may bring a lawsuit
to challenge the state's decision not to accommodate his religious
practice. In court, however, the state may not insist that the employee
accept a lower salary if the accommodation is granted. Indeed, the
state may never even have considered that possibility. It will simply
argue that it does not have to grant any exemption at all. In response
to the state's litigation position, the court adjudicating the employee's
claim would have to determine whether there is some manageable
way for the state to grant the accommodation and also reduce its secu-
lar value to the plaintiff.
By any account, that is an intrusive role for a court to accept and
perform. It is particularly problematic because the state may have
little incentive to help the court develop ways to mitigate the secular
value of any proposed accommodations. The inability to come up
with such an arrangement, after all, would count against the plaintiff's
claim since it invokes the problem of privileging. From the state's
perspective, the court's difficulty in arranging ways to limit the secu-
lar benefit accruing from an exemption simply fortifies the state's
argument that no exemption should be constitutionally required in the
first place.
The situation may not be so dire, however. Courts may handle
these cases somewhat like they adjudicate freedom of speech cases
that require them to determine whether a less restrictive alternative
exists for furthering the state's legitimate interests than the challenged
speech regulation. In theory, in free speech litigation, the state bears
the burden of satisfying this standard of review. In practice, however,
it is often the plaintiff challenging a speech regulation who has to
persuade the court, at least initially, that less burdensome alternatives
exist.57 In response, the state will attempt to justify its law by demon-
57 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666-70 (2004) (holding that government
did not adequately refute plaintiff's contention that blocking and filtering software represented
less restrictive alternatives to the restrictions on speech mandated by the Child Online Protection
Act).
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strating that the plaintiff's proposed alternatives are less feasible or
effective than the challenged regulation.
Similarly, in free exercise cases, under an anti-privileging adjudi-
catory framework, the plaintiff may have to propose ways to mini-
mize the secular benefits he would receive if the accommodation he
seeks is granted. If the state challenges the sufficiency of the plain-
tiffs proposal (on the grounds that it does not reduce the surplus
benefits enough), or argues that the plaintiffs proposal is unaccept-
able for administrative reasons, the court will have to evaluate the
competing arguments. But this is not altogether unfamiliar terrain for
courts. The primary difference from conventional constitutional liti-
gation involving other rights is that in those cases the court focuses on
the extent to which protecting a right interferes with the state's inter-
ests or imposes costs on third parties or the public. Here, however, it
will focus on the extent to which protecting the right provides mate-
rial benefits to the person exercising the right. The distinction is
noteworthy, but it should not require courts to engage in unreasonably
intrusive judicial review. In most cases, the court can evaluate the
plaintiff's proposals and the state's responses without taking on the
burden of coming up with privilege mitigating conditions on its own.
This leads to the next problem. How can a court determine what
constitutes a sufficiently non-privileging accommodation to pass con-
stitutional muster in order to justify its mandating the sought after
exemption? Some cases will be easier than others. In Catholic Chari-
ties, for example, it should not be that difficult to determine the cost
of adding prescription drug coverage for medical contraceptives to the
employees' existing health plan. That is the secular benefit Catholic
Charities would receive if it were granted an exemption from Califor-
nia's WCEA requirement. Under the simplest scenario, Catholic
Charities could direct that additional expenditure to any of a variety
of its charitable programs that serve the public good. In doing so, it
would entirely eliminate any economic savings it received as a result
of the exemption that it sought.58
58 If California had acted sensibly in this matter, which it did not, it would have offered
this alternative in the first place. The State could have set up a supplemental insurance program
for the employees of religious organizations it exempted from the coverage of the statute. The
cost the State incurred for providing the insurance coverage would be roughly offset by the
benefit the public received from Catholic Charities increasing its contributions to one of its
charitable programs. If California adopted this approach, the State's goal of providing medical
contraceptive insurance coverage would be accomplished, the religious autonomy of Catholic
Charities would be respected, the State would not incur any significant costs, and Catholic
Charities would not receive any economic benefit from the exemption.
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In the case of the public employee who seeks a weekend day off to
observe his Sabbath, it should also be possible to determine the value
of a weekend day off, or at least some rough estimate of the value of
that day off, compared to a day off in the middle of the week. Pre-
sumably there is some amount of money that would induce an em-
ployee to view coming to work on the weekend and receiving a
weekday off instead as a fair trade. Wage supplements for weekend
and holiday work are not that extraordinary and might prove helpful
in determining the secular value of a weekend day off.
Admittedly, other situations would be more problematic. In the
case of conscientious objectors, one might reasonably suggest that at
least three years of alternative service is necessary to offset the bene-
fit of an exemption from two years of military service. Perhaps even
that is inadequate.
The idea, of course, is not to arrive at some precisely equivalent
alternative. That would be impossible in many cases. The goal is to
arrive at a sufficient reduction of the secular benefit accruing to
religious individuals as a result of their receiving a constitutionally
mandated exemption to avoid their being privileged in any
significant, material way. Ideally, a doctrinal framework committed to
implementing this objective might induce the parties involved, the
individuals and institutions seeking an exemption, and the
government initially inclined to deny the request, to work out
settlements that avoid recourse to the courts. Since litigation exposes
both sides to something they would prefer to avoid (a judicially
mandated exemption for the state and a benefit reducing condition for
the religious person), working out a mutually agreeable compromise
might seem advantageous to both parties in many cases.
There are some aspects of the privileging issue that may remain
problematic. Much of the concern about distorting the marketplace of
ideas by exempting religious institutions from regulatory burdens that
their secular counterparts must obey can probably be resolved by
conditioning exemptions on the reduction of secular benefits. To the
extent that any residual apprehension about the privileging of
religious messages remains, however, that should be offset by
the enforcement of a separate constitutional mechanism, the
Establishment Clause. Clearly, current constitutional restrictions on
the government's endorsement and promotion of religion benefits
secular beliefs-in that, for the most part, with some obvious
exceptions, they are the only kinds of ideas that government may
communicate to citizens. Since government speaks frequently and
loudly through a variety of public institutions, limiting government
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speech to secular messages gives the marketplace of ideas something
of a secular emphasis.59 Free exercise exemptions indirectly restore a
constitutional balance by freeing religious activities and institutions
from state regulatory interference. True, private religious voices may
be amplified by these exemptions. It is hard to argue, however, that
this unreasonably privileges religion in the marketplace of ideas when
the Establishment Clause restricts government from endorsing
religion, while allowing state promotion of secular ideas.
60
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment also operates to
foreclose the privileging of religious speech. Under current doctrine,
religion is considered to be a viewpoint of expression.61 Any attempt
to use the Free Exercise Clause to exempt religious expression from a
content-neutral regulation of speech, for example, would run head-on
into the First Amendment's prohibition against viewpoint discrimina-
tion.62 Few cases to date even indirectly confront such a situation, but
those that do strongly suggest that mandatory exemptions for reli-
gious expression from otherwise constitutional speech regulations are
not acceptable.63 Indeed, requiring such exemptions would transform
a long line of cases invalidating discrimination against religious
59 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 131-33, 185-86 (1992).
60 See generally Religion Clauses, supra note 26, at 268-78; Michael W. McConnell,
A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHi. L. REV. 329, 330 (1991) ("This combination-
'singling out' under the Establishment Clause, 'equal treatment' under the Free Exercise
Clause-is a powerful instrument for the secularization of society. It is hard to see anything
neutral about it.").
61 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (holding that
a school's exclusion of a club due to its religious beliefs is viewpoint discrimination); Rosen-
berger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995) (holding that with-
holding funds for a student group because of religious beliefs is viewpoint discrimination);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,394 (1993).
62 See False Messiahs, supra note 19, at 164-69.
63 In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the
Court upheld the application of content-neutral speech regulations to the distribution and sale of
religious materials, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs considered their expressive activities
to be a religious ritual. In doing so, the Court entirely ignored free exercise concerns and applied
the relatively deferential standard of review required by free speech doctrine. More recently, in
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), the Court
reviewed restrictions on religious canvassers solely from a free speech perspective. See also
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down legislation that exempted
publishers of religious material from taxes that their secular counterparts were required to pay as
a violation of the Establishment Clause); False Messiahs, supra note 19, at 129-38.
In theory, the doctrine that a law abridging so called "hybrid rights"--that is, a law bur-
dening both free speech and free exercise rights--should receive more rigorous review than the
standard of review required by either free speech or free exercise doctrine standing alone would
support exemptions for religious speech from content-neutral speech regulations. But that doc-
trine has received limited support in the case law and is subject to serious criticism. See infra
notes 226-66 and accompanying text.
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speech on public land as impermissible viewpoint discrimination into
a bizarre system that requires both equal and greater access for reli-
gious speech on public property. 64
The remaining concern about the privileging of religion involves
exemptions that permit religious individuals to engage in otherwise
unlawful practices that cause harm to third parties or impose costs on
the public. This issue is distinct from the surplus secular benefits that
accompany religious exemptions. The concern here is not with the
gain to the religious individual, but rather with the loss to third par-
ties, or the public. Religion is privileged in the sense that protecting
its exercise justifies sacrificing the interests of others. Conditioning
exemptions to reduce secular benefits is irrelevant to, and cannot
remedy, this problem.
Insisting that the religious individual make the person who is
harmed whole, through the payment of damages, is also not a solu-
tion. In some cases, compensation is inadequate (some harms are ir-
reparable). In others, mandatory compensation would be prohibitively
expensive. In these situations, requiring the religious individual to
compensate those who are harmed by granting an exemption nullifies
the utility of the accommodation. Avoiding the privileging of religion
(by prohibiting the harm causing conduct or requiring the payment of
damages) effectively prevents the religious individual from exercising
his faith. Unlike the private necessity situation-in which the defen-
dant's material gain in accident avoidance from the exercise of the
privilege rationalizes the payment of damages for harm caused to the
plaintiff's property-here the entire purpose of the exemption would
be undercut.
Thus, there are situations when the privileging of religion, in the
aforementioned sense, simply cannot be avoided if certain exemptions
are granted. This does not necessarily mean that all such exemptions
must be rejected, however. In some circumstances, mandatory exemp-
tions that risk harm to others or impose costs on the public can be
6 For example, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), the
Court held that it was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination for a school district to deny
after hours access to a religious group that planned to hold meetings that were equivalent to
religious services on school property when civic groups were permitted to use school facilities
for their secular expressive activities. In light of Good News Club, if the school district denied
access to its facilities to all outside groups, and that content-neutral regulation was upheld on
free speech grounds, it would be anomalous in the extreme to conclude that the Free Exercise
Clause required the school to grant the religious group an exemption from this requirement. If
the Court adopted such an approach, the religious group would, in essence, be able to demand
equal access to public property on free speech grounds and preferential access to the same
property on free exercise grounds. See False Messiahs, supra note 19, at 166-67.
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justified.65 In other situations, the harms or costs resulting from the
granting of exemptions simply cannot be tolerated. For free exercise
doctrine to accomplish its purpose when the exercise of religion in-
flicts harm or costs on others, it has to provide a framework for de-
termining when such exemptions are warranted and when they must
be denied. To consider how that question can be answered, we have
to confront the problem of balancing more directly.
B. Creating a Framework for Free Exercise Balancing
1. The Unavoidability of Balancing
Any complex framework for protecting free exercise rights will
involve some kind of balancing test. That it should do so is hardly a
surprise. Balancing tests pervade constitutional law.66 It makes no
sense to argue that we should take free exercise rights seriously in the
same way that we take freedom of speech or equal protection guaran-
tees seriously, and insist at the same time that we cannot utilize the
65 The privileging of religious individuals and institutions through religious exemptions
that provide them surplus secular benefits is a problem that is relatively unique to the protection
of free exercise rights. It has little bearing on other fundamental rights cases. When courts
protect freedom of speech, for example, no one complains that speakers are receiving material
benefits that are unavailable to those who choose to remain silent.
Privileging rights by protecting their exercise, even when doing so imposes some costs on
others, is a much more common occurrence. Indeed, this form of privileging is intrinsic to the
very idea of what it means to protect rights. Thus, the conventional benefit (or privilege) an
individual receives when courts protect freedom of speech arises from the exercise of the right
itself and the concomitant power to impose uncompensated burdens on third parties, not from
any auxiliary material advantages that accrue to speakers, as opposed to non-speakers.
This form of privileging is typically justified by the constitutional commitment to protect-
ing the interest in question as a right in the first place. Accordingly, its existence should not
undermine the protection of free exercise rights per se any more than it undermines the protec-
tion of other fundamental rights. There are limits to the scope of such privileges, of course.
Judicial balancing is necessary to determine the extent to which the right will be protected when
it conflicts with various state interests. But that analysis presupposes that treating the right as
"special," or privileged, is appropriate in some circumstances, at least to some extent. Thus, the
argument suggested by some courts and commentators that the protection of free exercise rights
can never justify allowing religious individuals to engage in activities that cause harm to others
or to the public must be mistaken-unless the protection of free exercise rights operates entirely
differently than all other constitutional rights. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
6 See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-88 (1988) (balancing to review con-
tent-neutral speech regulations); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (balancing to
review procedural due process claims); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(balancing to resolve dormant commerce clause dispute); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)
(balancing to determine reasonableness of search). For commentary describing the range of
balancing in constitutional doctrine, see Aleinikoff, supra note 14, and Fallon, supra note 33, at
77-83.
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kinds of tests that courts employ when they adjudicate cases involv-
ing these, and other, comparably complex rights.
67
Taking rights seriously requires courts to carefully determine when
the interests subsumed by the right can be sensibly taken off the table
of democratic control. Clearly, this means the right should not always
be subordinated to any state interests that conflict with its exercise.
We do not take a right seriously by sacrificing it to trivial interests.
Less obviously, a serious fundamental rights jurisprudence also sug-
gests that not every burden on the right must be justified under strict
scrutiny review. Broadly defined rights cannot always receive rigor-
ous protection because doing so would unreasonably interfere with
the government's ability to further the public good. No democratic
society will surrender its power to pursue interests that conflict with
rights so completely and irrevocably. Insistence on a rigid commit-
ment to rigorous review risks an obvious response: the scope of the
right will be limited to only those situations in which it does not con-
flict with any interests the society values or cares about.
68
Current free exercise doctrine illustrates this phenomenon all too
well. Today, abridgements of free exercise rights are reviewed under
a form of strict scrutiny that is almost always fatal in fact. An
abridgement only occurs, however, if religion or a specific religion is
singled out for discriminatory treatment. So defined, free exercise
rights rarely interfere with the state's ability to pursue its interests
effectively. 69 Few, if any, legitimate state goals can only be achieved
through religious persecution or discrimination. But such a limited
definition of free exercise rights provides no protection whatsoever
67 The contrary implication suggested in Smith is simply inaccurate. See Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 743, 760 (1992) ("[T]he assertion [in
Smith] that judicially manageable standards are lacking here more than in other areas of consti-
tutional adjudication simply rings false. A wide variety of constitutional controversies-those
concerning reproductive rights, equal protection, or disputes between the President and Con-
gress, to name only a few-require complex judgments concerning the scope, weight, and
reconcilability of competing interests." (footnote omitted)).
68 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 955-59 (1994) (discussing the virtue of "judicial
flexibility in determining what constitutes the infringement of a right").
69 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the
Court applied strict scrutiny to city ordinances that constituted a religious gerrymander and were
designed to suppress the practices of a particular religious group, the Santeria religion. So con-
strued, the ordinances had virtually no chance of surviving rigorous review. Indeed, it is safe to
say that any law that invokes strict scrutiny under the Smith regime will be summarily struck
down. The problem, of course, is that in the overwhelming majority of free exercise disputes it
will be impossible to prove that the intent of a challenged ordinance is blatantly anti-religious or
that the resulting ordinance is so narrow as to only affect the targeted religion.
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against a broad range of state action that interferes with or burdens
religious practices.
An alternative, serious framework requires courts to respect both
the right and the state interests that conflict with its exercise. Often,
inevitably, this involves the use of balancing tests. There are so many
examples in constitutional doctrine that prove this point that it is hard
to see how it can meaningfully be challenged. Some balancing tests
are explicit. Consider the review of content-neutral speech regula-
tions. Courts use a multifactor balancing test to evaluate such speech
restrictions for two reasons.70 First, freedom of expression means
little if the government can control the time, place, and manner where
speech may occur at its unfettered discretion. Second, and of equal
importance, requiring a narrowly tailored compelling state interest to
justify every content-neutral regulation of speech sacrifices far too
many legitimate and important state interests to people who want to
speak as loudly as they can, as often as they can, wherever they
choose to express themselves.71
A similar analysis applies to the review of restrictions on the
speech of public employees. Here, courts consider even more factors
than they do when they review content-neutral speech regulations and
do so under an even more indeterminate and subjective balancing
72analysis. Nor is freedom of speech the only area in which balancingtests are employed. Some, but not all, ballot access regulations are
70 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54-59 (1994) (applying balancing test to
strike down an ordinance prohibiting display of signs on private property); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 482-88 (1988) (evaluating various factors in holding that an ordinance prohibit-
ing picketing in front of private residences was facially valid).
71 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 72, 75-76
(1987) (arguing that allowing individuals to gather at any place and time would cause intoler-
able disruptions). See also In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 149 (Cal. 1970) ("Freedom of everyone to
talk at once can destroy the right of anyone effectively to talk at all. Free expression can expire
as tragically in the tumult of license as in the silence of censorship.").
72 In evaluating regulations that limit the speech of public employees, courts must first de-
termine whether the employee's speech is a matter of public concern, an inquiry requiring
consideration of the content, form, and context of speech at issue. If the employee's expression
does involve a matter of public concern, the court will employ a balancing test to determine
whether the employee's speech interests are outweighed by the state's interests in the effective
functioning of its public services. The implementation of that balancing test requires the weigh-
ing of several factors including the content of the message being expressed, the time, place and
manner in which the employee's expression occurs, the degree of importance of the employee's
speech, the effect of the speech on the employee's ability to perform his responsibilities, and the
impact of the speech on the efficiency of the government employer's operations. See generally
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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reviewed under a balancing test.73 Procedural due process require-
ments are determined by a balancing test.74 The list goes on.
75
On other occasions, balancing is implicit in the doctrinal frame-
work courts utilize. It is common for courts to implicitly engage in
balancing when they determine what constitutes an infringement of a
right. Sometimes this form of balancing is rudimentary. For example,
not every burden on the right to marry invokes strict scrutiny review.
Minor burdens are upheld routinely. The government must justify
only substantial burdens by a compelling state interest.76 Obviously,
the determination that only laws that substantially burden a right must
be justified by compelling state concerns reflects some weighing and
balancing of the competing interests.
In other circumstances, the analysis of what constitutes an in-
fringement more directly implicates a balancing of interests. The
court is not simply asked to determine whether an infringement is
substantial, but also whether it is undue.77 Determining what consti-
tutes an undue burden goes beyond an inquiry into the magnitude of
the burden on a right. It also asks whether it is in some sense exces-
sive or inappropriate. This question can not easily be answered with-
out considering the nature and weight of the state's interest, as well as
the extent of a regulation's interference with the exercise of the
right.78
The tailoring requirement of conventional intermediate scrutiny
also can be understood as a form of balancing. When courts consider
alternative ways that the state can further its interests, they take into
account the increased cost or loss in effectiveness of alternative regu-
lations, as well as the degree to which alternative regulations mitigate
73 See Brownstein, supra note 68, at 914-17 (describing ballot access cases).
74 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that an analysis of pro-
cedural due process involves weighing three factors: "First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.").
75 See supra note 66.
76 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 38687 (1978) (explaining that not "every
state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must
be subjected to rigorous scrutiny" but that strict scrutiny is appropriate in cases where "[t]he
statutory classification at issue.., clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right
to marry').
'n See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-79 (1992)
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) (discussing the meaning and effect of an undue
burden on the right to have an abortion).
78 See Brownstein, supra note 68, at 878-92 (discussing the meaning of an undue burden).
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the burden on the right. If an alternative regulation is more expensive
to implement than the challenged, right-burdening statute, or is not
quite as effective in achieving the state's goal, but it will substantially
reduce the burden on the right, is the statute under review narrowly
tailored? Answering this question in any meaningful way requires the
balancing of increased cost or reduced effectiveness against a de-
crease in interference with the exercise of the right.
79
Moreover, even if one rejects the argument that constitutional
standards such as intermediate level scrutiny involve implicit balanc-
ing, it is still the case that these standards are subject to the same
criticisms that are directed at balancing tests. The problem with bal-
ancing, according to its critics, is that it is subjective, value laden,
policy driven, and usurps the legislature's prerogatives.8 0 But these
same criticisms, of course, have been directed at the use of intermedi-
ate level scrutiny in equal protection cases. 8 There is no completely
objective way to determine whether a gender-based law, or a law dis-
advantaging non-marital children, is substantially connected to an
important state interest. Notwithstanding those criticisms, equal pro-
tection jurisprudence does not insist that all gender classifications
must either be upheld under rational basis review or struck down un-
der strict scrutiny. If judicial subjectivity is the price to be paid for
courts to take gender equality seriously, equal protection doctrine
accepts that cost.
Thus, the problem with developing complex free exercise jurispru-
dence cannot be that it necessarily involves balancing or the applica-
tion of subjective standards. Balancing and subjectivity is too much of
the meat and potatoes of a typical constitutional law diet for that ar-
gument to be accepted. If balancing is an unacceptable dimension of
free exercise doctrine, then there must be something unique about free
exercise rights that make them a more problematic mechanism here
than in other constitutional contexts.
2. The Alleged Difficulty with Free Exercise Balancing
As noted previously, there are several alleged problems with em-
ploying a balancing standard to protect free exercise rights. These
concerns break down into two separate problem areas. The first, and
79 Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 969-7 1; Fallon, supra note 33, at 78-79.
8o See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
8, See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's adoption of an intermediate level scrutiny standard as unprincipled and an usurpation
of legislative prerogatives).
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probably most important, issue involves the difficulty in drawing dis-
tinctions between situations requiring a more rigorous or a more def-
erential standard of review. Arguably, free exercise doctrine will be
unidimensional. There is no basis for drawing distinctions among free
exercise claims. All cases will be subject to the same, largely ad hoc
and indeterminate, balancing test.
The second problem focuses on the process of balancing itself, not
the unitary nature or rigor of the standard of review. Here the sugges-
tion is that there is no legitimate or principled way for courts to adju-
dicate free exercise claims. Religious belief systems are rigid, all or
nothing, frameworks. All religious obligations must be obeyed, and
they can only be satisfied through literal compliance with the tenets of
one's faith. Thus, there is no religious analogy to the multiple factors
courts consider in free speech balancing, such as whether there are
alternative avenues of communication available to the speaker. Put
simply, there will be no way to explain why, or predict whether, vari-
ous government interests will be found to justify the substantial bur-
dening of one religious practice, but not another. In free exercise
cases, there simply is not any way to decide cases that will promote
predictability and uniformity.
82
Moreover, what many courts will take into account in free exercise
cases, implicitly and inevitably, is something they are constitutionally
prohibited from considering-the truth or value of the religion that is
the source of the plaintiffs claim. All religions should be treated as if
they are of equal weight by courts. But that requirement will be
impossible to police given the indeterminacy of the balancing test
courts will apply. The subjectivity inherent in ad hoc balancing is
particularly dangerous in the free exercise context because it creates a
substantial risk of favoritism toward larger and more conventional
faiths. On the rights side of the scale, courts will assign greater weight
to commonly understood practices of well-known Christian
denominations. On the state interest side, courts will more readily
recognize government interests that conflict with the practices of
lesser known faiths as important or compelling. Religious partiality
will be unavoidable.83
2 See Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Viii. L. REV. 3, 14-16, 23 (1979) (suggesting that
outcomes are unpredictable due to courts' selective use of precedent to support predetermined
conclusions); Marshall, supra note 7, at 311-12 (discussing the unpredictability of balancing
tests when applied to religious freedom).
83 See supra note 37.
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a. Learning from the Distinctions Drawn in Other Doctrinal Areas To
Identify Situations Requiring More or Less Rigorous Review
These concerns are legitimate, but they are exaggerated. Free exer-
cise doctrine need not be so devoid of guidelines and distinctions.
There are a variety of considerations courts may take into account to
help differentiate cases and evaluate the competing interests that are
at stake.
Consider the concern that no distinctions can be drawn in free ex-
ercise cases that justify the application of varying standards of review.
If we look at the jurisprudence that has developed with regard to other
constitutional guarantees, it is clear that such distinctions are com-
monplace. Courts often recognize core aspects of a right as well as
aspects of the right that lie at the periphery of the right's protection.
Core aspects of the right are assigned greater weight in adjudicating
conflicts between the right and state interests. Accordingly, courts
require a stronger justification for burdening them.
There are numerous examples of courts identifying key sub-
categories within the scope of a right that deserve careful attention.
Free speech cases, for example, regularly suggest that political speech
is special; laws that burden it merit particularly careful considera-
tion.s4 At the other end of the continuum, some speech may be en-
tirely unprotected, as is the case with true threats or obscenity. 5 Other
expression is recognized to be of lesser value, although it is still pro-
tected to some extent. Often these categories of lesser protected
speech are defined by indeterminate and multifactored parameters,
and laws that regulate such speech are evaluated under complex stan-
dards of review. Thus, for example, publications of false facts are
protected against defamation actions under doctrinal rules that con-
sider both the status of the victim and whether the reputation injuring
speech relates to a matter of public concern.8 6 Vulgar or indecent lan-
84 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956) ("The protection given speech ...
was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738,
749 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Political speech-speech at the core of the First Amendment-is highly
protected."); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L.
REv. 705, 705 (2004) ("[P]olitical speech-speech intended to influence political decisions--is
afforded the highest protection under the First Amendment.").
85 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (discussing obscenity); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (discussing threats).
8 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(holding that states may permit awards of presumed and punitive damages based on defamatory
statements that are not a matter of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418, U.S. 323,
342, 347 (1974) (distinguishing between public figures and public officials who may only
recover in defamation suits "on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was
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guage is less protected when it is communicated in inappropriate lo-
cations to unconsenting or immature audiences, and its regulation
may be justified by laws directed at the secondary effects it may
cause.
87
Similar distinctions are drawn in other constitutional areas. The
core of equal protection doctrine is the prohibition against race
discrimination. Discriminatory laws classifying on other
problematic grounds, such as gender, receive less rigorous review.
89
Groups defined by other characteristics, such as non-marital children,
also receive less expansive protection.9" With regard to other
fundamental rights, courts will focus on protecting what is intrinsic to
the nature of the right. For example, the core of the right to have an
abortion, according to the Supreme Court, is the ability of a woman to
make an informed, reflective, and deliberate choice about whether she
wants to continue her pregnancy and bear a child.91 Abortion
regulations designed to hinder that ability are much more likely to be
struck down than those that materially burden obtaining an abortion
for the purpose of insuring that a woman's decision is considered and
knowledgeable.92
Recognizing that distinctions identifying core aspects of rights are
a common part of constitutional doctrine does not demonstrate con-
clusively that the same analysis may be used to develop free exercise
jurisprudence. But, it does point us in a useful direction. Some cau-
tion, however, is necessary in pursuing this line of inquiry. What is
common among rights is the existence of these kinds of distinctions,
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth," and private figures,
as to which, "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual").
87 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding law
directed at secondary effects of adult businesses under deferential review); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (applying lenient standard of review to reprimand of station
broadcasting indecent speech to an audience including minors).
88 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879). Even in prison or when engaged in for benign, remedial purposes, race dis-
crimination is taken seriously. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504-06 (2005); Adarand
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995).
89 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that gender classifications will
be less rigorously reviewed than racial classifications and will be upheld if they "serve
important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to achievement of those
objectives").
90 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-62 (1988) (applying intermediate level scrutiny to
laws that disadvantage non-marital children).
91 Brownstein, supra note 68, at 885 n.58.
92 Id. at 884-85.
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not their rationales. The reason why political speech is recognized as
being at the core of what the First Amendment protects has little to do
with the reason why prohibiting racial discrimination is a core equal
protection concern. Identifying what courts recognize to be the pri-
mary purpose of each of these two constitutional provisions tells us
little that is directly relevant to free exercise doctrine. Determining
the core purpose of free exercise rights requires an independent
analysis.
b. Identifying Core Components of the Free Exercise Doctrine
Identifying some subareas of the free exercise of religion that
deserve special constitutional attention is a daunting task. The best
that one can offer is a regime of possible alternatives. There is no
consensus on the primary purposes of free exercise rights that has the
persuasive force and doctrinal utility of our constitutional
commitment to protecting political speech or prohibiting racial
93discrimination. This lack of consensus should not be seen as an
insurmountable obstacle to doctrinal development, however. One
need not agree with all of the specific suggestions offered in this
article for the development of free exercise doctrine to accept the
basic idea that doctrinal distinctions are possible and desirable. The
goal of this article is to provide enough examples of possible doctrinal
rules that resonate with readers to persuade them that this project is
worth pursuing. Agreement as to the utility or value of any specific
suggestion is of secondary importance.
Probably the most widely acknowledged foundation for protecting
free exercise rights is the idea of freedom of conscience. 94 Unfortu-
nately, in an important sense, this foundation is also ill suited as a
basis for doctrinal development. I do not dispute the importance of
this principle. Free exercise jurisprudence cannot avoid taking it into
account. For many people, it is the most persuasive reason for advo-
cating a rigorously enforced and expansively defined free exercise
regime.
The problem with focusing on freedom of conscience alone as the
core meaning of free exercise rights is that it does not assist us in
drawing distinctions and creating guidelines for the adjudication of
cases. All religious obligations implicate freedom of conscience, and
93 To gain some sense of the range of arguments offered to justify the protection of free
exercise rights, see supra note 16.
94 See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 40, at 22-28; JOHN WITE, JR., RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERENT 39-44 (2000).
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doctrinal development requires moving beyond universally applicable
principles to identify distinctions within the coverage of a right. It is a
truism that freedom of speech protects the right of people to commu-
nicate with each other. But identifying the core concern of the free
speech doctrine as the protection of communication does not move us
forward in working through free speech problems.
Again, I am not suggesting that freedom of conscience is beyond
the scope of what the Free Exercise Clause protects. I simply
recognize that it does not provide a core class of activities or
characteristics that can be identified as requiring distinctive
constitutional treatment. Moreover, it is important to remember the
current state of free exercise doctrine and its history. The rhetoric of
freedom of conscience has always far exceeded legal reality. Under
existing doctrine, freedom of religious conscience receives virtually
no constitutional protection against neutral laws of general
applicability. 95 For most of our constitutional history, the Free
Exercise Clause did not provide serious protection to religious
practices or religiously motivated conduct.96 Even during the
relatively brief period between 1963, the date when the Supreme
Court breathed some life into free exercise doctrine in Sherbert v.
Verner, and 1990, the date when Employment Division v. Smith was
decided, courts spent most of their time explaining why free exercise
rights could not be protected in particular cases, rather than rigorously
reviewing laws that interfered with religious practices.97 Identifying
some core free exercise areas that deserve serious constitutional
attention, even though that will fall short of a broadly stated and
rigorously protected freedom of conscience, may still provide
significantly greater constitutional protection to religion than free
exercise rights receive now or have received in the past.
So what are these core components of the free exercise of relig-
ion-and what kinds of laws must receive more rigorous review be-
cause they burden or interfere with them? There is some utility in
thinking about freedom of speech as a place to begin our inquiry, not
95 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
96 See JAMES HrrcHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 18-31
(2004) (describing the limited role of the Free Exercise Clause in protecting religion and con-
cluding that "[diuring the first 150 years of its existence the Court demonstrated only a modest
interest in religious liberty, and almost always did so under some rubric other than the Free-
Exercise Clause").
97 See FLOWERS, supra note 4, at 37-42 (describing how during this period the Court often
"refused to explicitly apply the compelling state interest test and consistently decided [free
exercise cases] in favor of the government"); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise
Discourse, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 117, 118-23.
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because the nature of free speech and free exercise rights share sub-
stantive meaning, but because speech is a pervasive aspect of life and,
in that sense, its protection raises some of the same problems as free
exercise rights. It is inconceivable that all acts engaged in for expres-
sive purposes (or allegedly motivated by expressive purposes) should
receive rigorous constitutional protection. The need to draw distinc-
tions is as stark for speech as it is for religion.
If we think about freedom of speech, we see that although freedom
of speech serves both instrumental and dignitary purposes, it is the
former that represents the core value of the right. Political speech
receives maximum protection, in theory if not in practice.98 More
importantly, most of the kinds of speech assigned lesser value and
weaker protection---obscenity, true threats, false facts, vulgar or inde-
cent expression, and commercial speech-are designated as lesser
protected or unprotected speech at least in part because their regula-
tion or suppression will not interfere with the instrumental role of
speech in a democratic political system.99
The Free Exercise Clause seems different. Its core purpose focuses
on the role of religion in the life of the individual and the family, and
the way that burdens on a person's religious belief and practice vio-
late his integrity and autonomy. 1°° The instrumental value of religion
is secondary at best.
While this hierarchy of free exercise values is generally accepted,
it may understate the instrumental value of religion. Further, there
may be circumstances when the instrumental utility of religion and
the dignitary dimension of religious exercise overlap and intertwine.
Those situations in which protecting religious liberty serves both in-
strumental and dignitary purposes may be particularly deserving of
constitutional protection.
98 See supra note 84; Melville B. Nimmer, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3-5 (1984)
(recognizing that while nonpolitical speech is often protected by the First Amendment, "in the
balancing of interests, political speech, or speech dealing directly with the governing process, is
likely to be given somewhat more weight than other forms of speech as against their respective
counterspeech interests").
Indeed, a central reason why we protect political speech that has some real tendency to in-
cite or result in unlawful behavior is that prohibiting such expression will distort democracy by
shielding government from criticism. See generally Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1917).
99 Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Un-
protected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
553, 614-15 (1996).
10OSee Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Frag-
mentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
89 (1990); Alan E. Brownstein, The Right Not To Be John Garvey, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
770-74 (1998) [hereinafter Not To Be].
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What, then, is the instrumental value of religion? Putting dignitary
interests aside for the moment, what purposes does the exercise of
religion further that justify providing it constitutional protection? I
suggest there are four social purposes or values that are uniquely, or
at least substantially, furthered by religion. First, religion serves as an
independent source of values. That is, it is a source of values structur-
ally divorced from government.' 0' The argument here is hardly new.
Popular sovereignty has little meaning if government determines the
values of the people and molds them into the government's image of
what constitutes good citizens. If government is to be of the people,
by the people, and for the people, it has to, in some meaningful sense,
be separate from the people.10 2 Religion promotes democracy and
political accountability by developing and reinforcing values against
which government decisions can be measured.'0 3
101 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 6, at 136-37 (arguing that religious institutions can "supply
a bulwark against majority tyranny," but they "can make a difference in how their adherents see
the world only if they remain independent from the world"); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WiS. L. REV. 99, 161-62 (sug-
gesting that religious groups are uniquely qualified to serve as a check on government because
they are independent creators of values). See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court
1982 Term, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
Bette Novit Evans appears to agree, although she describes the function of religion as a
check on government and its function as a source of values and meaning as independent justifi-
cations for the protection of free exercise rights. EVANS, supra note 40, at 32-40.
102 Not To Be, supra note 100, at 783.
103 Bette Novit Evans states this point explicitly. "Religious institutions serve as additional
means of checking the power of government ... [Tlhey provide additional points of entry into
the political system and offer policy alternatives that expand the political agenda. The church-
based civil rights, social justice, prolife, and pacifist movements, the Sanctuary Movement, and
the Catholic Bishops' Letter on the Economy illustrate some ways independent religious institu-
tions foster alternative conceptions of public policy and influence government toward those
ends." EVANS, supra note 40, at 162.
Corwin Smidt offers a similar argument:
In its public role, religion may serve as one of the voices to which political power
should be responsive in the formulation of public policy. A democratic polity cannot
restrict and, in fact, should welcome moral insights into debates over issues involv-
ing important ethical questions. Such moral perspectives act as a counterweight to
necessary but demoralizing pragmatism. By reminding the state of its ethical obliga-
tions, religion can play an important public role in democratic life. Religion can also
help protect democratic society from movement toward greater statism and potential
totalitarianism. Democratic governments are based on the principle of limited gov-
ernment, and religion serves as a major bulwark that can challenge the authority of
the state when it exceeds its rightful boundaries.
Corwin Smidt, Religion, Social Capital and Democratic Life: Concluding Thoughts, in
RELIGION AS SOCtAL CAPITAL 211, 221 (Corwin Smidt ed., 2003) (endnote omitted).
See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 33-43 (1993); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Pluralism,
Integralism, and Political Theories of Religious Accommodation, in OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 3, 19 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) ("[R]eligious
groups perform classic liberal democratic functions when they enter political arenas self-
defensively to insure toleration, publicize and resist oppression, protect the weak against power-
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A facile response to this argument is that religion is not the only
source of private values in our society. Individuals and institutions
need not be religious to participate in the development of normative
principles or cultural beliefs. That is true, of course. But, what distin-
guishes religion from other sources of values in our society, at least in
a constitutional sense, is not only its focus on morality and ethics, but
also its separation from government. Other sources of value develop-
ment are more susceptible to government influence. Accordingly,
they lack the independence of religion in establishing normative
guidelines by which government may be evaluated. In this sense, a
rigorously enforced Establishment Clause that maintains the separa-
tion of church and state reinforces the instrumental value of religion
and supports an important justification for rigorously protecting free
exercise rights in some significant circumstances. °4
Second, and this is related to the first purpose, religion is intrinsi-
cally spiritual and focused on transcendent values. 10 5 It is isolated
ful elites, curb careless and arbitrary exercises of power. They have always been vital checks on
government."); Ronald F. Thiemann, Public Religion: Bane or Blessing for Democracy?, in
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 73, 85 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000)
("Because people of faith share the fundamental values of democratic societies, they remain
connected to public life even as they engage in criticism; because their commitment to democ-
racy remains penultimate, however, they can appeal to transcendent ideals to critique current
practice and to elevate the understanding of democratic values themselves . . . .People of
faith-pilgrim citizens and connected critics-can help churches and other communities of faith
serve as 'schools of virtue' for a pluralistic democracy, places where the critical consciousness
of an informed citizenry can be nurtured.").
"m See Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 798-799 (2001-2002)
(explaining that while Madison saw established religion as a threat to liberty, he recognized that
religion that maintained its independence from the state would serve "as a crucial oppositional
force in politics and a vital check on the tyranny of the majority").
105 See Erik A. Anderson, Group Rights, Autonomy, and the Free Erercise of Religion, in
GROUPS AND GROUP RIGHTS 267, 272-73 (Christine Sistare, Larry May & Leslie Francis, eds.,
2001) ("[R]eligious conceptions of the good typically include some reference to a 'transcendent'
or 'extrahuman' source of value, order, and meaning. For religious believers, this transcendent
authority guides their endeavors toward what is truly of value, supplies norms that transcend the
prerogatives of individual choice, and gives each member of the group a sense of fulfillment
that stems from living in the light of a higher truth." (citation omitted)); BENJAMIN BErr-
HALLAHMI & MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOUR, BELIEF &
EXPERIENCE 6 (1997) (describing the core of all religions as "a system of beliefs in divine or
superhuman power, and practices of worship or other rituals directed towards such a power");
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 31 (1995) ("Religious
belief in the Western tradition is centered on a transcendent force or belief-that is, a force or
belief that is beyond the material, phenomenal world."); Robert Wuthnow, Can Religion Revi-
talize Civil Society? An Institutional Perspective, in RELIGION AS SOCIAL CAPITAL 191, 207
(Corwin Smidt ed., 2003) ("[R]eligion provides opportunities for reflection about higher-order
values .... [T]he presence of religious institutions in the society maintains possibilities for
discussions about values that could not occur were these institutions to disappear.").
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from material concerns in important respects." As such, it is di-
vorced from the more commonplace foundation of political account-
ability in our society: the material self-interest of individuals and
groups. I do not mean to denigrate material self-interest as a source of
personal values or as a check on government conduct. It is an intrinsic
and necessary part of a democratic system. There are functions of
government and alleged abuses by government, however, that cannot
be evaluated effectively solely in terms of the self-interest of organ-
ized groups or political majorities. 1°7 The public good may require
self-sacrifice and consideration for others. Religion may not be the
only foundation for looking beyond one's immediate material needs
and wants in our society. But it is certainly a significant source of
such beliefs and commitments.
10 8
Indeed, the voluntary organization of religious congregations in
the United States and the construction of churches, synagogues, and
other houses of worship are by their very nature counterweights to the
individual's routine emphasis on material self-interest. Few members
of a religious congregation make money by participating in a reli-
gious community. The reverse is much more commonly the case.
Creating and sustaining a religious congregation and house of wor-
ship requires extraordinary contributions of time and resources by its
members. Few participants in a religious congregation would describe
their reasons for making such contributions in terms of material bene-
fits to themselves or their families.
109
106This does not mean that religious beliefs do not influence a believer's decisions in the
material temporal world. They clearly do. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Some Political Implica-
tions of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 419, 427-36 (1990). But the
source and focus of the belief is not material self-interest.
It is also true, of course, that there are intrinsic limits on the ability of religions to focus on
the transcendent and ignore material concerns. HITCHCOCK, supra note 96, at 3 ("One of the
inherent paradoxes of religion is that most faiths enjoin a spirit of unworldliness, urging believ-
ers to look beyond earthly possessions in their search for ultimate reality, while at the same time
all religions exist in the temporal order and can only manifest themselves through material
realities.").
'07Gedicks, supra note 106, at 421 ("[Rleligion enters political dialogue as religion, and
not as an interest group, when it seeks to provide a point of moral reference to public policy
debates .... Religious groups do not enter these debates to protect an economic interest; rather,
they seek to witness against a moral wrong by testifying to transcendent truth.").
15 See Ram A. Cnaan, Stephanie C. Boddie, & Gaynor I. Yancey, Bowling Alone but Serv-
ing Together: The Congregational Norm of Community Involvement, in RELIGION AS SOCIAL
CAPITAL 19, 29 (Corwin Smidt ed., 2003) (explaining that the "teachings of all major religions
emphasize mutual responsibility, the need to assist strangers in need, and most importantly, the
legitimate claim of the weak and needy upon the community").
1091ndeed, religious individuals are disproportionately philanthropic. See Daniel 0.
Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113,
1171 n.227 (1988).
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Third, religion has a communal dimension to it, 1° typically
grounded in a center or place of worship,." It is a source of commu-
nity in a highly individualized society' -a society in which people,
with continuing changes in technology, are becoming more and more
isolated from direct human interaction with others. This function of
religion may be taken for granted because it is such a common part of
American life. If one were to imagine the city where he or she lives
without a single house of worship in it-a town where no one con-
gregates together for religious purposes or under the auspices of a
religious organization-I think the resulting picture would be one
with a dramatically reduced level of social interaction.
Fourth, and finally, religion is grounded in tradition. 1 3 It is a
source of community not only in geographical terms, in that it con-
nects us with other residents in the area where we live, but it is also
the foundation of a temporal community, a connection between our
contemporaries and past generations. Religion is about continuity and
the passing on of beliefs and practices from the past through the liv-
110See generally EVANS, supra note 40, at 121-23; ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLiNG ALONE
66 (2000) ("Faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most
important repository of social capital in America. 'The church is people... It is relationships
between one person and the next.' As a rough rule of thumb, our evidence shows, nearly half of
all associational memberships in America are church related, half of all personal philanthropy is
religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context." (footnotes
omitted)); Howard M. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: Rediscovering Religious Commu-
nity and Ritual, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1800 (1994); John H. Garvey, Churches and the Free
Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 567, 588-99 (1990); Gedicks,
supra note 101; Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 29, 56-58 (2004).
It is noteworthy that Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), one of the seminal free ex-
ercise cases in American jurisprudence that actually protects religious freedom, emphasizes the
communal nature of the Amish religion. That the Court did so is hardly surprising since the
Amish made this contention a cornerstone of their constitutional argument. Cover, supra note
101, at 29 (quoting the argument from the Amish brief in Yoder that "[t]here exists no Amish
religion apart from the concept of the Amish community").
III See Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 831 (10th Cir. 1988)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "housed worship has been historically central to relig-
ion"); BElT-HALLAHMI & ARGYLE, supra note 105, at 54 (noting that "[m]ost religious behav-
iour consists of the meetings of groups of believers to engage in worship and related activi-
ties"-often in a house of worship, but also in the home); Ronald R. Garet, Communality and
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1983) (describing groups as
"possible sites for religious experience. They are locations at which religion builds its edifices").
12 See CNAAN, BODDIE, & GAYNER, supra note 108, at 25 (explaining that religious con-
gregations are not only a place where persons find spiritual meaning, but they are also "social
settings within which people of similar backgrounds and interests come together to form small
groups"); PUTNAM, supra note 110, at 67 (describing a survey that "found that religious atten-
dance was the most powerful predictor of the number of one's daily personal encounters").
113 See BErr-HALLAHMI & ARGYLE, supra note 105, at 4 (explaining that most people "re-
gard themselves as followers of a religious tradition").
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ing and on to subsequent generations.'1 4 In a society where genera-
tions are given names and identified with decades, or even shorter
periods of time, and in which history seems to have lost its hold on
our identities, there is something to be said for institutions that oper-
ate over the long term and are less likely to be swayed by the passions
of the moment. Indeed, this function of religion is a particularly sali-
ent one for developing constitutional doctrine. One of the purposes of
having a constitution interpreted by an independent judiciary is to
provide a legal counterweight to political demands fueled by the pres-
sure of immediate needs and fears.'
15
These instrumental values of religion in American society resonate
with, and overlap, significant facets of religious life that we associate
with human dignity and autonomy. We respect as a core aspect of
personhood the acknowledgment of, and adherence to, a moral
code. 16 The fulfillment of human potential extends beyond hedon-
ism. 17 The search for meaning, the spiritual quest for understanding,
and a relationship with the transcendent, is part of the human condi-
tion as well."18 Thus, the role religion plays in the development of
values serves both instrumental and dignitary interests. Also, human
dignity inheres in our associations, in our need to interact with oth-
ers."19 Part of the way we define our identity is not simply as indi-
viduals, but as members of groups. 20 As a social mechanism that
114 See id. at 98-112 (describing the "intergenerational transmission" of religious beliefs
such that "[c]ontinuity in religious identity between generations is the rule rather than the excep-
tion, and is the result of deliberate effort within the family and in formal educational settings");
Carter, supra note 6, at 137-38 (lauding the "important historical role [of religions] as vital
transmitters of values-of meanings-from one generation to the next"); see also ANDERSON,
supra note 105, at 273.
115 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28 (2d ed. 1962). In
Joseph Story's words, without an independent judiciary, "public justice will be administered
with a faltering and feeble hand.... It will decree, what best suits the opinions of the day; and it
will forget, that the precepts of the law rest on eternal foundations." JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 593 (1987) (1833).
116 See Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have To Do with Freedom of Conscience?,
76 U. COLO. L. REv. 911, 932 (2005) ("[H]aving and acting on core beliefs is central to what
makes us 'persons."').
117 Id. at 930-32; GARVEY, supra note 16, at 23-27.
"
8 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY-THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 348-51 (1998) (describing how the freedom to search for
religious truth is grounded on human dignity in contemporary Catholic doctrine).
19 See Garet, supra note 111, at 1002 ("[C]ommunality is one of the characteristic
structures of existence and, in that sense, of the intrinsic human good. To rob existence of
communality, of the communal celebratory process which forms the substance of much of our
experience, would be to deny one ethical constituent of our humanity.").
'12This idea "that the individual self is not an asocial atom but is constituted in large
measure by its social inheritance and continuing participation in a community" is the central
thesis of communitarians. Carl Wellman, Alternatives for a Theory of Group Rights, in GROUPS
AND GROUP RIGHTS 17, 32 (Christine Sistare, Larry May & Leslie Francis eds., 2001). One
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promotes community, religion advances the personal potential of in-
dividuals as well as the public good. Finally, the raising of one's fam-
ily, the transmission of values and beliefs to our children, and the
connection between generations that links our grandparents to our
grandchildren are components of human dignity as well.' 2 1 Few insti-
tutions are as committed to promoting this aspect of personal life and
development as organized religion.
Accordingly, we might reasonably identify the core of what the
Free Exercise Clause protects as those aspects of religion that
uniquely reflect both instrumental and dignitary values. Government
actions that interfere with, or burden, these aspects of religious
exercise would require particularly persuasive justification. More
specifically, these core concerns suggest that religious institutions,
particularly those committed to worship, religious education, or
charitable activities should receive significant protection from
regulatory interference with regard to their development and
operation, notwithstanding the neutrality and general applicability of
the regulatory scheme applied to them. More than individuals,
religious institutions further these core virtues-the development of
an independent source of values, spirituality, community, and
tradition.
I do not suggest this sphere of institutional autonomy should be
absolute and inviolate. No rights are absolute. The independence of
religious institutions can and should be outweighed by important
government interests. There is no escape from balancing. But courts
can distinguish between core and tangential aspects of rights and
should require stronger justifications from the state when the core of
the right is abridged-just as they do routinely in free speech and
equal protection cases. In free exercise cases, courts should require a
higher burden of justification to sustain state regulations that
substantially burden the development and operation of religious
need not adopt the communitarian position entirely to recognize the core of truth in its
assumptions.
Religious groups in particular play a critical role in the identity of believers. See
COOKSON, supra note 22, at 171-72; Gedicks, supra note 101, at 149 ("Many individuals have
developed a sense of personal identity and self worth from interactions with others in religious
communities.").
121 See Christine Sistare, Groups, Selves, and the State, in GRouPs AND GRouP RIGHTs 1,
4 (Christine Sistare, Larry May & Leslie Francis eds., 2001) ("For most parents, in fact, it is the
transmission of values and the molding of character that are the ultimate tasks of parenting.");
Gamnett, supra note 31, at 133-34.
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institutions involved in worship, religious education, and charitable
undertakings.
Protecting the autonomy of religious institutions through free
exercise doctrine can be grounded, to a limited extent, on existing
authority. Notwithstanding the rule set out in Employment Division v.
Smith, courts regularly protect a religious organization's discretionary
authority in hiring clergy or other employees whose duties are
intrinsic to the carrying out of its religious mission against the
mandates of federal or state civil rights statutes. 122 Also, federal
statutory law exempts religious organizations engaged in nonprofit
activities from Title VIl's prohibition against religious discrimination
in the hiring of employees. 123 The federal Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) provides for the rigorous
review of land use regulations that substantially interfere with the
ability of congregations to develop land for religious uses, such as the
construction of houses of worship.124 These examples are not intended
to suggest that fully developed free exercise doctrine must necessarily
parallel these statutes in their scope, or with regard to the standard of
review they employ. They do demonstrate, at a minimum, however,
that protecting religious institutions from state regulatory interference
is hardly an idea without precedent or one with which our society
lacks all experience.
Moreover, some existing religious liberty statutes reflect concerns
that parallel the analysis of this article in identifying state action that
may warrant heightened review. The land use provisions of RLUIPA
are a good example. Under a constitutional regime committed to pro-
tecting the autonomy and utility of religious institutions, land use
regulations restricting the areas where houses of worship can locate
should be carefully reviewed. Preventing a congregation from devel-
oping a center for religious assembly cuts to the core of the commu-
nal nature of religious practice. 2 5 Also, a decision refusing to allow a
122 Courts demonstrated a marked reluctance to allow government to interfere with em-
ployment decisions relating to clergy and other employees performing religious functions prior
to the Smith decision, and have not altered their decisions in light of Smith. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Combs v. Cent. Tx. Annual Conf. of the
United Methodist Church, 173 F. 3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
124 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
125 See Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 755, 756 (1999) ("[A]ssembly for worship and other religious activities, and the creation of
spaces in which such assembly may occur, is at the very core of religious liberty."); Guru Nanak
Sikh Society v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152-53 (E.D. Cal. 2003)
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religious institution to locate in an area zoned for commercial use
would seem to be a particularly problematic burden to impose on the
use of land for religious exercise because it is directed at the spiritual
and non-materialistic nature of religion.1 26 These kinds of restrictions
trap religious congregations between competing municipal goals.
Because places of worship do not contribute sales tax revenue to the
community, do not provide good paying jobs to employees, and will
not attract shoppers to the area, they are excluded from locations
where the predictable externalities associated with houses of worship
-noise, traffic congestion, and the like-are least likely to be an is-
sue.1 27 Finally, prohibiting the modification of an older house of wor-
("[Pireventing a church from building a worship site fundamentally inhibits its ability to prac-
tice its religion." (quoting Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1226 (C.D. Ca. 2002)), afftd, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006).
126 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 771 (7th Cir.
2003) (limiting access to houses of worship in commercial zones in comparison to other permit-
ted uses because churches "do not enhance commercial activity"); Cornerstone Bible Church v.
City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 468 (8th Cir. 1991) (excluding churches from central business
district because they would displace commercial uses and undermine economic vitality of area);
Vineyard Christian Fellowship v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978 (N.D. IM. 2003)
(attempting to justify exclusion of churches from district in which cultural and commercial
facilities are permitted on grounds that non-religious uses "tend to draw more people into [the
City] who will dine in the City's restaurants and visit the City's shops"); Int'l Church of the
Foursquare Gospel v. City of Chicago Heights, 955 F. Supp. 878, 880-81 (N.D. I1. 1996)
(prohibiting church from locating in commercial corridor because it will not further the goal of
"attracting the purchasing public" to the area); Laycock, supra note 125, at 762 (suggesting that
local officials oppose locating churches in business districts because they do not want property
in the area taken off the tax rolls); Clay Carey, Ministry, Millersville at Odds, THE
TENNESSEAN, June 9, 2006, at 1B (reporting opposition to church leasing building previously
used as a church, pizza parlor, and video rental store because the city wants to preserve land on
major artery "for taxpaying businesses"); Tess Nacelewicz, Church Faces Zoning Hurdle-
Chinese Gospel Church Seeks Variance To Allow It To Relocate to Area Set Aside for Business,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, March 11, 2006, at C1 (describing town councilor's concern that
"the church's plan is at odds with the town's effort to expand its business tax base in the area
where the church wants to locate").
127See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1222, 1234-35
(1 th Cir. 2004) (excluding synagogue from business district because churches and synagogues,
which do not hold events that are "'unrelated to [their] religious and spiritual mission or
purpose' will 'contribute little synergy to retail shopping areas and disrupt the continuity of
retail environments'); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F.
Supp. 2d 507, 516 (D.N.J. 2005) (prohibiting houses of worship in a commercial zone because
the "presence of a church within this limited zone would most likely not contribute to" the
town's goals of developing a downtown district with "a performing art and artistic center,
supported by restaurants, cafes, bars and specialty retail stores"); City of Chicago Heights v.
Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 53, 59 (M1. App.Ct.
1998) (prohibiting church from locating in area zoned for commercial uses "to regenerate
declining revenues and create a strong tax base"), afTfd in part and rev'd in part, 196 ll.2d 1
(2001); see generally Collin Nash, Prayers and Contention; Churches see Crowded Pews.
Neighbors Fear Crowded Streets. Both Sides Feel Frustration as Congregations Seek To
Expand, NEWSDAY, March 26, 2006, at G06 (discussing how religious congregations may be
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ship that is still used for services to further historical preservation
goals ignores the transcendent purposes for which the building is used
and the spiritual nature of its function. The value of the physical edi-
fice to the larger community is assigned a higher value than the utility
and spiritual relevance of the building to the congregation that uses it
to exercise their faith.
128
Other illustrations of the kind of analysis I propose lack statutory
analogies. One might reasonably assume that the autonomy of reli-
gious schools should be respected by government with regard to the
functions they perform in transmitting the doctrine, values, and rituals
of the sponsoring faith. Adherence to ritual and belief is part of the
basic fabric of family life for many religious people. Passing on reli-
gious traditions from parents to children, often through a generational
chain that may extend over centuries, or even millennia, is critically
important to most faiths. For many, teaching morality to their children
in the context of duties to G-d, is the primary foundation for rules of
good behavior. Of equal importance, for the purpose of this article,
these functions relating to tradition and the development of independ-
ent values are instrumentally valuable to society.
129
Obviously, the state's interest in insuring that children receive
adequate preparation in subjects substantially related to the state's
educational goals-preparation directed toward what an adult must
know to be a law abiding, productive member of society and an
informed citizen-is important and cannot be ignored. But state
denied access to land in residential areas because of parking and traffic concerns, and may also
be prevented from locating in commercial districts because they do not contribute to the tax
base); Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After
Boerne, 68 GEO. W. L. REV. 861, 878-79 (2000) (describing how religious land uses may be
caught in a bind because "neighbors' objections to the more intrusive land use-make it
difficult to locate in residential zones, and the lack of income-generating activities make
religious uses less desirable candidates for commercial zones").
128 See Debbie Messina, Congregation's Plans Hit Snag with City, Neighbors, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Dec. 21, 2005, at B I (describing conflict between a church's attempt to construct a large,
contemporary addition to expand its overcrowded building and groups contending that the
proposed design violates zoning guidelines in historic district); see, e.g., First Covenant Church
v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (holding that church's right of free exercise was violated
by ordinances that placed specific controls upon church's ability to remodel its exterior); Epis-
copal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding
that city's denial of a permit that would allow church to demolish old building and construct a
new one did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act). See gener-
ally Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to
Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401 (1991).
129See Cover, supra note 101, at 61-62 (arguing that religious schools must be protected
from state interference because "[t]he school's central place in the paideic order connects the
liberty of educational association to the jurisgenerative impulse itself').
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attempts to achieve such goals through more intrusive regulatory
approaches, such as curriculum regulations or teacher credentialing
requirements, rather than less burdensome methods, such as the
regular administration of proficiency exams, should require a serious
burden of justification. 30
As for religious charitable institutions, a case like Catholic Chari-
ties v. Superior Court1 3 1 provides a fairly straightforward example of
a dispute that should invoke some form of serious review. As noted
previously, Catholic Charities sought an exemption from a state law,
WCEA, which required it to violate the tenets of the Catholic faith by
providing employees a health insurance plan that covered medically
prescribed contraceptives. By insisting on compliance with WCEA's
requirements, the state obviously placed a serious burden on Catholic
Charities' ability to fulfill its charitable mission in a way that was
consistent with the obligations of its faith.
There is no doubt that the Catholic position on medical contracep-
tion is a countermajoritarian position in today's culture. The point of
protecting the ability of religious institutions to serve as a source of
values is not to suggest that any religion's principles are necessarily
superior to those of the government, or the majority. The point is that
society benefits from the existence and checking function of inde-
pendent sources of moral authority. The Catholic Church's position
on medical contraceptives represents just such an alternative moral
vision-whether one agrees with it or not.132 As such, we should pro-
tect its ability to be faithful to that vision against state regulations that
undermine its moral integrity-unless some sufficiently important
state interest is at stake that cannot be adequately furthered through
some other means.
130 I do not suggest that proficiency exams are always an adequate or satisfactory means to
further the state's legitimate interest in furthering the secular curriculum offered at a religious
school. Determining when and whether states can satisfy the serious burden of justification
required of them to defend intrusive regulations controlling the operation of religious schools is
a difficult question that is beyond the scope of this article. My argument is that such justifica-
tions should be required and that courts are capable of evaluating them. See, e.g., New Life
Baptist Church Acad. v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940, 954 (1st Cir. 1989) (con-
cluding after careful analysis that limited visits by public authorities to observe secular classes
at religious schools under a policy that prohibits any observation or evaluation of religious
matters do not violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment).
131 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
132 Religious support for gay rights provides a contrasting alternative vision. The religious
institutions reflecting that perspective are equally deserving of constitutional protection. See
generally Melissa M. Wilcox, Of Markets and Missions: The Early History of the Universal
Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, 11 RELIGION & AM. CULTuRE 83 (2001)
(discussing the origin of the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches and
their inclusion and advocacy for the LGBT community).
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The fact that some employees of Catholic Charities are not Catho-
lic or do not adhere to this specific religious principle should not alter
the basic analysis in this case. While many religious charities employ
and provide services to persons of different faiths (indeed, they may
be religiously compelled to do so), they will still require that the op-
eration of their charitable programs conform to the sponsor's religious
commitments. A soup kitchen sponsored by a Jewish organization
may serve meals to indigent Christians as well as Jews, but its kitch-
ens will still conform to Jewish dietary laws. A state law requiring it
to serve food that is not kosher would be a serious intrusion, not
unlike the burden imposed on Catholic Charities by WCEA. Under
the adjudicatory framework proposed here, that burden would have to
be justified, and that justification would be subject to a more rigorous
standard of review than that which is applied to individual free exer-
cise claims.
Determining that some form of serious review would be
appropriate in a case like Catholic Charities is only the first step in
the constitutional analysis. It is equally important to explain, at least
in some preliminary way, how such an analysis would proceed.
Clearly, state concerns about the privileging of religious organizations
by relieving them of financial costs that other employers must incur
could easily be satisfied by conditioning an exemption from WCEA
on Catholic Charities spending an amount equal to the cost of the
contraceptive insurance coverage to serve some other public purpose.
But California had other reasons for refusing to grant the exemption
that Catholic Charities sought that had nothing to do with the
privileging of religious institutions. If Catholic Charities did not have
to comply with WCEA, the state maintained, either its employees
would not receive the equitable insurance coverage guaranteed by the
act, or, alternatively, the state would have to assume the cost of
providing the coverage.' 33
To the California Supreme Court, this argument was conclusive.
Even if the Court applied strict scrutiny to the WCEA, the Court
maintained that this was a simple case. The fact that granting an
exemption to Catholic Charities would result in the imposition of
some burdens or costs on third parties, or the public, essentially ended
the Court's inquiry and required a ruling in favor of the state.'3" The
133 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 93-94; Real Parties in Interest's Answer Brief on the
Merits at 30, available at 2002 WL 985444.
3 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 93 ("We are unaware of any decision in which this court,
or the United States Supreme Court, has exempted a religious objector from the operation of a
neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would
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constitutional project of protecting religious liberty had to be a cost
free enterprise. Any resulting harms to, or burdens on, third parties or
the public, no matter how slight, would justify the denial of an
exemption.
That approach, obviously, cannot be characterized as taking free
exercise rights seriously. But arguing that the California Supreme
Court's analysis in the Catholic Charities case was unacceptable does
not explain how cases like this one-that involve a cost or harm to
third parties or to the state itself if an exemption is granted-should
be resolved. Subjecting the application of WCEA to Catholic
Charities to some form of rigorous review because the law burdens
the free exercise rights of a religious organization tells us little about
how courts are to take those costs and harms into account. If harm to
the public or third parties does not always require a ruling in favor of
the state, how can a court correctly identify those cases in which the
free exercise autonomy of religious institutions is outweighed by
competing state interests? Ultimately, we are left with the problem of
explaining how courts can balance the burden on the institutional
autonomy of religious organizations that results from denying them
an exemption with the cost or harms that result from granting an
exemption to a general law. To answer that question, it is necessary to
confront the nature of balancing in free exercise cases directly.
c. A Default Principle for Individual Exemptions
If the autonomy of religious institutions deserves special constitu-
tional protection pursuant to some form of heightened scrutiny, we
are still left with the question of how individual free exercise claims
should be evaluated. I suggest that it is necessary for courts to engage
in some kind of balancing of interests in these free exercise cases as
well, although the rigor of the balancing test applied will be more
modest. When the burden on religious practice or religiously moti-
vated behavior results from the application of a neutral law of general
applicability, the Court's answer under the rule of Smith gives us a
different result. Under Smith, such claims receive highly deferential,
rational basis review. Even substantial burdens on religious practice
are construed not to abridge free exercise rights. The Free Exercise
Clause simply does not apply to such disputes.
detrimentally affect the ights of third parties.").
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That answer is inadequate. The analysis in Smith focuses exclu-
sively on the impropriety and impracticality of applying strict scrutiny
review to every case involving a substantial, but incidental, burden on
religious practice or religiously motivated conduct. There is virtually
no discussion of adjudicatory alternatives. Obviously, however, a
variety of less rigorous tests or standards are available. Consider just
two possibilities. Content discriminatory and content-neutral regula-
tions of speech on public property that has not been intentionally
opened up for expressive purposes, what is called a nonpublic forum
under current jargon, are upheld if they are reasonable. 3 5 Conced-
edly, this is a very low standard of review, but not all speech regula-
tions will survive it. A complete ban on the distribution of leaflets in a
large metropolitan airport, for example, would be unreasonable.
36
The state's interests could not justify such an all encompassing ban on
such an innocuous expressive activity as leafleting. Analogizing from
this free speech standard, one might argue, at a minimum, that neutral
laws imposing substantial burdens on the exercise of religion should
be unconstitutional as applied if the application of the law to religious
practices is not reasonable.
Alternatively, in early equal protection cases involving discrimina-
tion against non-marital children, the Court held that such laws would
be upheld despite the facial classification they employed-unless
plaintiffs could successfully demonstrate that the state's asserted in-
terests would not in fact be furthered by treating non-marital children
differently and less favorably than other children. Thus, to success-
fully challenge a law singling out non-marital children for disparate
treatment with regard to their eligibility for social security survivor
benefits, plaintiffs would have to prove that the provisions at issue
would not achieve the administrative convenience gains and cost sav-
ings the state asserted to justify its discriminatory policy. 137 This is
also a very low standard of review, but it is more than the total defer-
ence associated with rational basis review. Again, by analogy, one
might argue that, at a minimum, neutral laws of general applicability
are unconstitutional if plaintiffs can demonstrate that the state's as-
135 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(holding that the exclusion of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and other advocacy groups from
federal workplace charity drive did not violate First Amendment because the government's
grounds for its decision were reasonable); Members of the City Council of the City of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding ordinance prohibiting the
posting of signs on public property that reasonably furthered city's esthetic goals).
136See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683-85 (1992).
137 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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serted interest will not be furthered by denying them the exemption
that they seek.
38
Obviously, there are more rigorous standards of review than those
described above that will still fall far short of strict scrutiny. The
range of possible intermediate level standards (most, if not all of
which at least implicitly involve balancing) may be quite broad. But
the holding of Smith rejects all such possibilities--even though the
majority opinion never discusses any of them. If even very modest
standards of review like those described above are unacceptable, it
must be because the problems associated with employing any test
involving balancing to adjudicate free exercise claims are completely
insurmountable. The next section of this article considers that
possibility.
C. Making Balancing Work
It is impossible to entirely eliminate the subjectivity and indeter-
minacy that is inherent in balancing tests. That concession alone does
not require a rejection of balancing tests. No other area of constitu-
tional law involving the protection of rights is held to such a draco-
nian standard. Tests and standards involving balancing in one form or
another are regularly employed as long as some guidance is provided
and courts are not left to rely on a completely ad hoc balancing test.
Accordingly, if it is possible to establish some guidelines and pre-
sumptions that mitigate the concerns inherent in balancing tests to
roughly the same extent as exists in other areas of constitutional law,
138 The state's asserted interest in denying an exemption in some free exercise cases may
be so exaggerated that plaintiffs will be able to succeed in deir claims-even under a relatively
lenient standard of review. However valid the state's purpose may have been in enacting a
general law, that objective may not be seriously undermined by granting a limited exemption to
the members of a minority faith for whom the general law creates a religious conflict. See Berg,
supra note 5, at 40-41. Doubtlessly, a state law prohibiting adults from providing alcoholic
beverages to minors serves an important state interest, but it is hard to see how that interest is
burdened when I, and other Jewish families in my community, serve small glasses of wine to
our teenage children at our Passover Seder.
In other cases, the state's contentions regarding the harms caused by an exemption are
simply wrong and can be proven to be erroneous. In People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal.
1964), for example, the California Supreme Court rejected several of the state's concerns as
demonstrably false. The Court explained that "[tihe evidence indicates that the Indians do not in
fact employ peyote in place of proper medical care; and, as the Attorney General with fair
objectivity admits, 'there was no evidence to suggest that Indians who use peyote are more
liable to become addicted to other narcotics than non-peyote-using Indians.' Nor does the record
substantiate the state's fear of the 'indoctrination of small children'; it shows that Indian chil-
dren never, and Indian teenagers rarely, use peyote. Finally, as the Attorney general likewise
admits, the opinion of scientists and other experts 'is that peyote... works no permanent delete-
rious injury to the Indian."' Id
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that ought to be enough to justify applying at least some modest stan-
dard of review to laws that burden religious liberty-at least it ought
to be a sufficient showing to justify judicial review if we take free
exercise rights seriously.
If this article can successfully explain how standards of review for
free exercise doctrine can be developed that create no greater
problems for adjudication than the tests employed to protect other
rights, it will have come a long way toward accomplishing its
objective. At a minimum, it will have rebutted the argument that free
exercise rights cannot be protected against neutral laws of general
applicability because doing so would involve a particularly open
ended and discretionary form of balancing. Let us turn then to the
problem of developing guidelines and presumptions that reduce
judicial subjectivity and inform the adjudication of free exercise
cases.
1. Identifying Impermissible Justifications for Burdening Rights
One way to avoid subjectivity in balancing is to identify state in-
terests that are presumptively unacceptable as a basis for abridging a
right. These interests are in some sense fundamentally inconsistent
with the nature of the right. Thus, they can not justify infringing the
right to any extent. The weight assigned to such disfavored anti-right
interests is essentially zero.
Impermissible and problematic justifications for abridging particu-
lar rights are commonplace in the case law. Restrictions on speech
cannot be justified by the goal of protecting the government against
criticism of its policies or personnel. 139 Speech cannot be silenced to
maintain citizen complacency or to avoid exposure to unsettling in-
formation or arguments. 14° Expression cannot be prohibited because
the government does not believe that people are competent to evalu-
ate it and fears they will be persuaded or influenced by the proscribed
message. 141
139 Fallon, supra note 33, at 91-92.
140Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (explaining that the fact that symbolic
expression, such as the burning of the American flag, is highly offensive to many people cannot
justify its suppression by government); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(recognizing that speech is protected even when "it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissat-
isfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger").
141 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) ("[A] State's pater-
nalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information
unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it."); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 226-28 (1989) (noting that a "[s]tate's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its
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Equal protection doctrine similarly recognizes unacceptable or
inadequate interests that cannot sustain challenged classifications.
Racial classifications cannot be justified by arguing that they are
designed "to maintain White Supremacy" by preventing "the
corruption of blood" and "the obliteration of racial pride." 14 2 Also,
"the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might
inflict" are not "permissible considerations" that justify race-based
decisions, such as removing a child from the custody of her mother
because her mother married a man of a different race.143 The Court
has repeatedly noted that gender stereotypes, and "outmoded notions
of the relative capabilities of men and women," cannot sustain gender
classifications, even if they are supported by statistical correlations.144
Similarly, certain state interests cannot justify restrictions on the
right to have an abortion. "[A] state regulation [that] has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus" imposes an undue and un-
constitutional burden on the right. 145 The state's interest in protecting
fetal life by making it more difficult to obtain an abortion cannot jus-
tify restrictions on abortion services.
A similar analysis may be utilized in adjudicating free exercise
rights. Obviously, the state cannot justify restrictions on religious
practices because they defy religious orthodoxy or reflect beliefs that
are not accepted by a majority of citizens.146 Nor can regulations be
justified by presuming uniformity among religions and religious insti-
tutions. There is no right way, for example, to construct a house of
worship. A city cannot permit steeples, but not domes, because the
citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed
with some skepticism" in rejecting a ban on intra-party endorsements of candidates during
primaries).
142 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7, 11-12 (1967).
143 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
144See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135, 139 n.ll (1994) (quoting City
of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (holding that excluding otherwise qualified males from
attending an all female nursing school violated the equal protection clause).
145 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); see
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297, 329
(1997) (emphasizing that states cannot enact laws that serve the purpose of hindering access to
abortion services).
16See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding
city ordinances that banned the ritual slaughter of animals unconstitutional); Michael J. Perry,
Religion, Politics and the Constitution, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 407 (1986)
("[G]ovemment may not take any action, impeding a religious practice (or practices), based on
the view that the practice is, as religious practice, inferior along one or another dimension of
value to another religious or nonreligious practice or to no practice at all.").
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latter does not reflect the religious aesthetics of the community. 147
Nor can government limit the way a religious institution communi-
cates with congregants or structures its sanctuary on the grounds that
most religious organizations operate differently. A radio station used
by a church to broadcast its religious messages should not be rejected
as a permitted accessory use for land use regulatory purposes because
most congregations communicate through computers, telephones, and
newsletters rather than radio broadcasts.1 48 The design of a sanctuary
cannot be trivialized as interior decorating if it does not conform to
traditional ideas of what the interior of a house of worship should
look like. 
149
These are only a few examples. As the project of developing
meaningful free exercise doctrine progresses, one would expect courts
to recognize other unacceptable or inadequate justifications for regu-
lating religious practice. The identification of such impermissible
justifications for abridging free exercise rights will simplify a balanc-
ing test and make its application more objective without regard to the
rigor of the standard of review that is applied. Whether we are apply-
ing a more rigorous standard to a law that regulates the operation of a
house of worship or a less demanding standard to a law that burdens
an individual's religious practices, there is nothing to be balanced
when the state asserts an impermissible interest as its goal.150 In all
such cases, the religious freedom claim should be sustained.
147 See Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1329-32 (Haw.
1998) (upholding city's refusal to allow Buddhist temple saddle shaped roof to exceed zoning
height restrictions from which church spires are exempt).
148 See Vacaville Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Solano County, No. Civ. S 02-0336
MCE KJM (E.D. Cal. 2004). See also Living Waters Bible Church, v. Town of Enfield, No. 01
CV-00450-M (D.N.H. filed Nov. 7, 2001). For a synopsis of the Living Waters case, see The
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Living Waters Bible Church v. Town of Enfield,
www.becketfund.orglindex.php/case/62.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
149 Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573
(Mass. 1990). See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 121 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a house of worship such as a cathedral, "is not just a piece of real
estate .... [It is] the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority... [and] the outward symbol of a
religious faith"); Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular:
A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 837, 958
(1995) (noting that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution "a consensus emerged that
free religious worship must include the ability to erect houses of worship of the design
desired").
In a similar vein, communities may discount the religious aesthetics of minority faiths with
which they are unfamiliar. See generally Diana L. Eck, The Multi-Religious Public Square, in
ONE NATION UNDER GOD? 3, 10 (Marjorie Garber & Rebecca L. Wolkowitz eds., 1999) (de-
scribing how supporters of a Hindu Temple were required by local zoning authorities to alter the
ornate, Hindu influenced architecture they had proposed in order to conform to the city's prefer-
ence for a Spanish architectural style).
150See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
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2. Weighing State Interests
In most cases, free exercise claims will not be so easily adjudi-
cated. Typically, the interest the state asserts to justify its actions will
be legitimate. Here, courts cannot escape having to balance free exer-
cise claims against conflicting state interests. Courts need to examine
and assign some value to the religious practice at issue and the state
interest alleged to justify restricting the exercise of religion. Ideally, it
would be most helpful if guidelines could be developed that assist
courts in evaluating the interests on both sides of the constitutional
scale. Practically speaking, however, it is usually easier to critically
review and draw distinctions among state interests than it is to assign
a certain value to a particular exercise of a right. Accordingly, it
makes sense to begin the discussion on the state interest side of the
analysis to determine if there are ways to assist courts in evaluating
the importance of the interests a state may assert to justify the burden-
ing of religious institutions or practices.
a. Using Legislative Accommodations To Evaluate the Weight
Assigned to State Interests
Eugene Volokh, in a thoughtful and provocative article titled "A
Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 151 has argued that
broadly stated statutes protecting the exercise of religion, such as the
short lived Religious Freedom Restoration Act, are preferable to
constitutionally mandated exemptions. If an exemption is required by
constitutional law, courts are the only institutional body authorized to
evaluate the merits of the free exercise claim and the state's
competing interests. That may be a difficult job for the judiciary to
perform that exceeds its institutional competence. Determining the
consequences of granting an exemption from a neutral law of general
applicability may require a wider understanding of the ramifications
of even limited exceptions to the law's coverage than can be
presented to a judge in a court room. It may be, for example, that the
adverse impact of granting an exemption is not apparent to a court for
quite some time. The court could always decide to overrule its
constitutional decision granting the exemption when that evidence
became available to it in a subsequent lawsuit. But this constant re-
(stating that "there can be no serious claim" that laws targeting religious practices can be
justified).
15146 UCLA. L. REV. 1465 (1999).
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evaluation of the real world consequences of judicial decisions flies in
the face of stare decisis and undermines the stability of constitutional
determinations.
Grounding exemptions on a statute rather than constitutional doc-
trine, Volokh argues, provides a more direct role for the legislature in
scrutinizing the impact of religious exemptions. If, because of its in-
stitutional limitations, a court misunderstands the consequences of
mandating an exemption to a general law pursuant to a religious lib-
erty statute and mistakenly grants an ill advised accommodation, the
legislature can simply pass a new law rectifying the court's mistake
and requiring uniform obedience to the original regulation.1 52 We
expect legislatures to monitor the effects of statutes and to modify law
accordingly. Constitutional decisions are far less provisional and are
less susceptible to the monitoring of their effects and the expedient
revision of their holdings
Volokh's argument should not be taken lightly. But there are also
ways for courts to take advantage of the legislature's ability to weigh
the costs and monitor the consequences of religious exemptions to
general laws--even when the courts are interpreting and applying
constitutional standards. Statutory and administrative religious ac-
commodations are hardly unique in our society. There are hundreds of
formally recognized exemptions and countless other informal ar-
rangements that relieve religious individuals and institutions from
general laws and policies that burden the exercise of religion. 153 Many
of these accommodations are long-standing.
As Volokh recognizes, legislatures may amend or repeal these ac-
commodations at their discretion if the exemption proves problematic.
Each legislature's decision to do so, or not to do so, may provide
guidance for other political bodies confronted with similar requests
for accommodation. But that is not the limit of their utility. The re-
cord and evaluation of such accommodations may be relevant to the
constitutional adjudication of similar exemptions by courts. Courts
can draw reasonable inferences from the fact that existing accommo-
dations of religious practices do not cause problems'TM and are left in
1521dt at 1474-75. For additional commentary on the relative institutional capabilities of
courts and legislatures in evaluating and granting religious exemptions, see, for example, Ira C.
Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommoda-
tion of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991) and Steinberg, supra note 4.
153 James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic As-
sessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445-47 (1992) (asserting that "[rleligious exemptions ... exist
in over 2,000 statutes," and discussing several examples).
154 See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 819 (Cal. 1964) (countering the state's claim
that granting an exemption for the religious use of peyote would make it more difficult to en-
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place or, conversely, that certain exemptions are routinely rejected or
have been repealed after they were granted.
Given the number of religious accommodations in our society, it is
not difficult to see how this kind of an analysis might be applied regu-
larly to free exercise claims. Put simply, if several other legislatures
provide religious individuals or institutions the sought after accom-
modation, and have done so for some significant period of time, and
there is no evidence to suggest that the concerns motivating a particu-
lar state to deny the exemption have come to pass in other jurisdic-
tions, there is good reason to doubt the importance of the state interest
that is asserted to justify burdening religious practice. t55 So, for ex-
ample, if virtually every state in which members of the Native Ameri-
can Church reside provides a statutory exemption for the sacramental
use of peyote, and law enforcement officials in those states concur
that the exemption has not made it more difficult to enforce narcotics
laws or resulted in any noticeable increase in the recreational use of
the drug, then there is nothing subjective or value laden in a judge
taking that information into account in evaluating the importance of a
state's reasons for refusing to provide a similar accommodation. Ac-
cordingly, if the state asserts an interest in avoiding significant in-
creases in the use of peyote for recreational purposes as its primary
force the state's narcotics laws by noting "[t]hat other states have excepted from the narcotic
laws the use of peyote, and have not considered such exemption an impairment to enforcement,
weakens the prosecution's forebodings").
Courts have used a similar analysis to protect the free exercise rights of smaller faiths that
utilize peyote in religious rituals. In reviewing Texas' refusal to grant an exemption for the
religious use of peyote to members of the Peyote Way Church, a small off-shoot of the statuto-
rily exempt Native American Church, the Fifth Circuit noted in Peyote Way Church of God, Inc.
v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 1984), that:
The exemption granted both by federal and Texas law to the ritual use of
peyote by the Native American Church tends, as the [Peyote Way]
Church suggests, to negate the existence of a compelling state interest in
denying the same use to it. In the absence of evidence, we cannot simply
assume that the psychedelic is so baneful that its use must be prohibited
to a group of less than 200 members but poses no equal threat when used
by more than 250,000 members of the Native American Church.
Ultimately, the free exercise claims of the Peyote Way Church of God were rejected as a
result of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Smith. Noting that Smith "eviscerates
judicial scrutiny" of free exercise claims against neutral laws of general applicability-even
though the Court recognized that this would relatively disadvantage smaller faiths-the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the Church's free exercise rights were not violated by the Texas prohibition it
challenged. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir.
1991).
155 See Berg, supra note 5, at 44 n. 198 (citing Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1126-
27 (8th Cir. 1984)).
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justification for denying such an exemption, the experience of other
states may suggest that this interest is entitled to little weight.
56
Courts employ this kind of an analysis in religious liberty cases
today, but, after Smith, they can only do so under the authority of
federal or state statutes or state constitutional law. Clearly, as a case
like Warsoldier v. Woodford'57 demonstrates, strict scrutiny review
permits such an inquiry. In Woodford, a Native American prisoner
challenged the California Department of Corrections hair grooming
policy, which limited a male inmate's hair to three inches in length,
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). RLUIPA requires prison authorities to justify regulations
that substantially burden the religious exercise of an inmate under
strict scrutiny review. The prisoner argued that cutting his hair would
violate the religious faith of his tribe.
As is typically the case in prison religious liberty cases, the De-
partment of Corrections argued that the hair length requirement was
necessary to maintain prison security, an obviously compelling state
interest. The Ninth Circuit panel, however, was not persuaded that the
hair length requirement was the least restrictive alternative available
to prison authorities to further that interest, particularly at a minimum
security prison. The court noted that other prison systems including
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the largest correctional system in the
country, and prisons run by other states such as Oregon, Colorado,
and Nevada, do not have similar hair length policies or provide reli-
gious exemptions to them.158 It went on to argue that "the failure of a
defendant to explain why another institution with the same compel-
ling interests was able to accommodate the same religious practices
may constitute a failure to establish that the defendant was using the
least restrictive means."'159
A similar kind of an analysis is utilized in other areas of
constitutional law under less rigorous review. In gender
discrimination cases, courts look to the experiences of analogous
156Of course, analogies with other jurisdictions that refuse to grant accommodations for
good reasons can undermine the claim for an exemption. Exemptions for the religious use of
marijuana were often rejected on the commonly recognized grounds that the demand for, and
potential for abuse, of marijuana was far greater than the market for peyote. See, e.g., Olsen v.
DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Distinctions are also drawn between religious
communities with regard to the risks created by their respective practices. See, e.g., McBride v.
Shawnee County Court Servs., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Kan. 1999) (describing how the loosely
structured procedures for determining when marijuana should be smoked in the Rastafarian faith
distinguishes this claim for an exemption from that of Native Americans using peyote in rituals).
157418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005).158 Id. at 1000.
15 9 Id.
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institutions or other jurisdictions to determine whether the state
defendant's interests can justify gender-based laws and policies under
intermediate level scrutiny. In United States v. Virginia,160 the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) defended its gender discriminatory
admissions policies by arguing that accommodating women students
would fundamentally transform the institution, and undermine its
status and the quality of the education it provided. In rejecting VMI's
contentions, the Court pointed to the successful gender integration of
every federal military academy 61  and noted that such
accommodations were accomplished notwithstanding similar
predictions that the admission of women would destroy these
institutions. 162 The experience of West Point and other federal
military academies in accommodating women cadets, while
maintaining their ability to produce top-flight citizen soldiers,
provided the Court an objective basis for evaluating, and rejecting,
VMI' s claims.
In Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,163 California
argued that its gender-based statutory rape law served the important
state interest of preventing teenage pregnancies. Further, the state
explained, a gender neutral provision would substantially undermine
this objective. Young women would be reluctant to come forward and
report the offense if they rendered themselves vulnerable to prosecu-
tion by doing so. 64 While a plurality of the Court accepted Califor-
nia's argument, Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion demonstrated
convincingly that the state's justifications could not satisfy intermedi-
ate level scrutiny because thirty-seven states used gender-neutral laws
to prosecute statutory rape. The statutes of at least eleven of those
states were sufficiently similar to California's law to permit a direct
analogy. There was no evidence that any of those states were experi-
encing the kind of enforcement problems that California claimed
would result from the enactment of gender-neutral statutory rape
laws. 165 If intermediate level scrutiny means anything, states should
not be permitted to ignore the experience of other jurisdictions in at-
tempting to justify gender discriminatory statutes. Nor should they be
permitted to ignore the experience of other jurisdictions in attempting
16518 U.S. 515 (1996).
161 Id. at 544-45.
1621d. at 551 n.19.
163 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
164 Id. at 473-74.
165 Id. at 492-93.
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to justify their refusal to exempt religious practices from neutral laws
of general applicability.
A related form of this analysis applies when the state itself acts in
a way that undermines the credibility and weight of its interests. Typi-
cally, courts may challenge state interests here on the grounds that the
state's actions are unacceptably underinclusive. The Court's equal
protection cases reviewing laws that discriminate against non-citizens
provide striking examples of situations in which the state's justifica-
tions for challenged laws are undercut by related provisions in its
statutory scheme. In Sugannan v. Dougall,166 New York attempted to
justify its decision to deny non-citizens eligibility for competitive
civil service jobs on the grounds that public employees engaged in
"the formulation and execution of government policy" must be of
"undivided loyalty." 167 Yet New York statutes permitted non-citizens
to be hired to staff "the higher offices in the state executive depart-
ments," and many offices filled by election or legislative appoint-
ment.168 The inconsistency between the state's justifications and its
statutory scheme were impossible to ignore.
The Court identified a similar discrepancy in Bernal v. Fainter.
169
Although the Bernal Court struck down a Texas law prohibiting non-
citizens from serving as a notary public on other grounds, the Court
noted that Texas permits non-citizens to be court reporters, a position
that overlaps the functions of a notary in some respects. More dra-
matically, the Texas Secretary of State, the state official responsible
for the licensing of all notaries public, need not be a citizen. 170 In yet
another example, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,'7' plaintiffs argued that
a California law prohibiting non-citizens from serving as deputy pro-
bation officers violated the equal protection clause. Applying what it
had described in earlier cases as a rational basis standard of review,
the Court upheld the challenged law on the grounds that the state was
properly insuring that important governmental functions involving the
exercise of coercive police power remained in the hands of citizens. 172
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, maintained that California's decision
to exclude aliens from this position while permitting them to serve in
other, higher level roles related to the criminal justice system was so
1-413 U.S. 634 (1973).
167 Id. at 641.
'6 Id. at 639.
1- 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984).
170Id. at 222-23.
171454 U.S. 432 (1982).
12Idat 447.
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"haphazard as to belie the state's claim" about the purpose and effect
of the discrimination. 73 California permitted aliens to serve as law-
yers, trial judges, Supreme Court Justices, and as the supervisors of
county probation departments. Given the state's acceptance of aliens
in these various roles, it made no sense to argue that non-citizens
could not be trusted to serve as deputy probation officers.
174
Using a similar kind of analysis in a free exercise case, a court
might look to other religious exemptions the state has provided in
related situations, notwithstanding the alleged costs or problems asso-
ciated with the accommodation. If religious practices create similar
concerns, and the state exempts one practice from the requirements of
a law but not the other, there are strong reasons for concluding that
the state's alleged interest lacks substance. The United States Su-
preme Court employed this analysis in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,175 a recent Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA) 176 case involving the application of the Controlled
Substances Act to the religious use of hoasca, a sacramental tea con-
taining a listed hallucinogen, by a small Christian spiritist sect, 0
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV).
The government argued in 0 Centro that it had a compelling inter-
est in not allowing any exceptions to the prohibitions mandated by the
Act since the substances listed in Schedule I had been determined to
have "a high potential for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States," and "a lack of accepted safety for
use .. under medical supervision."' 177 In rejecting this argument, the
Court pointed to the long standing exception granted to the Native
American Church from the operation of the Act for the religious use
of peyote, another prohibited hallucinogen. The Court noted that pe-
yote had been determined to raise the same risks of abuse and the
same lack of utility for medical treatment as hoasca. Accordingly, it
concluded, if an exception could be granted (and maintained for over
thirty years) for the religious use of peyote "for hundreds of thou-
sands of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see
how those same findings alone can preclude any consideration of a
similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV
who want to practice theirs."
1 78
173 Id. at 461 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 442 (majority opinion)).
174 Id. at 460-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
175 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
17642 U.S.C. §2000bb et. seq. (West 2006).
177 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1220 (alteration in original).
178Id. at 1222. A similar analysis might be used to argue that that there were less restrictive
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Similarly, in a RFRA case, Sasnett v. Sullivan,179 plaintiffs chal-
lenged a Wisconsin Department of Corrections policy prohibiting
prison inmates from wearing jewelry. There was no general exception
for religious jewelry. Crosses and crucifixes were subject to the ban
but prisoners were permitted to have rosaries with a cross attached.
The Seventh Circuit held that the state's justification could not satisfy
RFRA's rigorous standard of review. The state's interest in prison
security was compelling, but it was not reasonably furthered by a
regulatory framework under which "[t]he state allows prisoners to
have rosaries, which could be used to strangle a fellow prisoner or
guard, and bans crucifixes even in correctional facilities wholly occu-
pied by white collar prisoners who do not belong to gangs or get into
fights with each other or the guards."
180
Nor is this kind of an analysis only appropriate under the rigorous
standard of review required by RFRA. The existence of such incon-
sistent accommodations could not survive even relatively modest
scrutiny. After RFRA was struck down on federalism grounds, the
Sasnett case was remanded back to the Seventh Circuit for further
review. Notwithstanding the invalidation of RFRA, the court affirmed
its earlier conclusion. Plaintiffs claim for an exemption for religious
jewelry, the court explained, would still have to be upheld, even un-
der the lenient standards of review required by Turner v. Safleyt 81 and
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,182 "because of the feebleness of the
state's safety argument." 183 The court ultimately determined it was
not necessary to adopt any particular standard of review to resolve
plaintiffs' claims because the disparate treatment of these two reli-
gious instruments was entirely without justification. A rule permitting
an inmate to have a rosary but not a crucifix discriminated among
alternatives available to the government to further its interests than an absolute prohibition
against the use of hoasca tea that covered even sacramental uses. For example, Judge McCon-
nell inquired in his court of appeals opinion "why an accommodation analogous to that extended
to the Native American Church cannot be provided to other religious believers with similar
needs.... [t]he apparent workability of the accommodation for Native American Church peyote
use strongly suggests that a similar exception would adequately protect the government's inter-
ests here." 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1030
(10th Cir. 2004), af'd, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
17991 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd 521 U.S. 1114, on remand sub nom. Sasnett v.
Litscher, 197 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1999).
Mo Id. at 1023.
181482 U.S. 78 (1987).
1- 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
183 Litscher, 197 F.3d. at 292.
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religious faiths, and as such, was unconstitutional under any free ex-
ercise analysis.'84
Let me reiterate that the critical point of these cases for the pur-
pose of this article does not depend on courts adopting a particular
standard of review in free exercise cases. The important common
denominator that underlies these courts' analysis, whatever standard
of review is applied, is that judicial balancing in religious liberty
cases can be grounded on an objective foundation-at least in some
situations.
b. Using Costs That Society Accepts To Protect Other Rights To
Evaluate the Weight Assigned to State Interests
In adjudicating free exercise cases, courts may also look to the
jurisprudence of other rights. It is important, however, to understand
the limitations inherent in this kind of reasoning. Comparisons
between or among rights are rarely dispositive of a constitutional
dispute. 85 Nor does looking to other rights presuppose that all rights
must be treated the same way. Still, when courts regularly determine
that certain state interests are not of sufficient weight to justify the
abridgement of various other rights, these conclusions provide an
objective reason for courts to question why the same state interests-
ones that do not outweigh free speech or equal protection interests,
for example -are sufficient to permit state interference with the
exercise of religion.
It is not difficult to identify public and private costs that have been
found insufficient to justify the abridgement of fundamental rights.
Indeed, generally speaking, we protect many rights even though doing
so imposes various burdens on individuals, the public at large, or the
government. These burdens include administrative inconvenience or
inefficiency costs, maintenance and wear and tear costs, out of pocket
financial expenses and loss of revenue, and attenuated social instabil-
ity and unlawful conduct costs. (The list is not intended to be com-
pletely inclusive.)
Administrative inconvenience and inefficiency problems are
common costs governments incur in protecting freedom of speech. If
speech is permitted on public property because the First Amendment
prohibits absolute bans on expression in streets, parks, and other gov-
ernment owned locations, state and local governments must regulate
those expressive activities. If they do not, the ensuing babel and
14Id. at 292-93.
185 See Brownstein, supra note 68, at 955-59.
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commotion will interfere with the other uses of the property.'1 6 If the
state does regulate the expressive activities it must allow on its prop-
erty, however, it will have to develop and enforce time, place, and
manner restrictions. It will have to issue permits, schedule access, and
monitor compliance. 87 These are obvious administrative costs.
Protecting individuals against compelled affirmation of belief also
creates administrative burdens. If a school cannot require all the stu-
dents in a school classroom to recite the pledge of allegiance,18 8 then
it will have to notify parents of their right not to have their children
participate in this exercise. There may also be logistical issues in ar-
ranging exactly how the classroom teachers deal with a student's non-
participation. Similarly, arranging for the deletion or covering of the
state motto on a license plate may involve administrative decisions
and accompanying costs.
189
Procedural due process requirements impose even greater costs on
society. Increased process not only costs money, it delays government
action. Necessary changes in personnel may be delayed or discour-
aged.'90 Commercial costs increase when creditors must satisfy proc-
ess requirements before they can repossess property. 91 Equality may
also be an expensive political good. Equal protection requirements
may prevent government from using accurate, cost saving generaliza-
tions, such as gender classifications, because doing so reinforces anti-
quated stereotypes of the role of women in society. The Court has
made it clear that such administrative convenience rationales cannot
satisfy intermediate level scrutiny to justify gender-based laws.' 92
I do not suggest for a moment that procedural due process rights,
equal protection guarantees, and free speech rights are not well worth
186 See supra note 71.
187 See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUrNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 111 (1999) (explain-
ing that "maintaining open public spaces [available for expressive activities] will ordinarily
entail nontrivial public expenses" such that "[tihe right to set up a soap box and enter a publicly
subsidized space where listeners can gather and supporters parade imposes costs on some citi-
zens for the benefit of others.") The Court has made it clear that permit and licensing systems
that apply to expressive activities must provide adequate guidelines to limit official discretion,
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), as well as appropriate procedural
safeguards, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
188W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
189 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
190Similarly, requiring a hearing before an individual can be dropped from the welfare
rolls, as procedural due process case law requires, may result in undeserving individuals con-
tinuing to receive benefits at the taxpayers' expense. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The expenses incurred in providing the hearing itself, of course, is another cost of pro-
cedural due process rights. See HOLMES & StNSTEIN, supra note 187, at 26-27.
191 David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 89-92 (2005).
19 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
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the price we pay for them. But we do pay a price. Any suggestion that
free exercise rights should not be protected whenever doing so causes
harm to, or imposes costs on, government or third parties-either
because it is improper to protect rights in such situations or because
courts have no way of determining when the resulting costs and
harms justify the infringement of rights193 -simply ignores the juris-
prudence of other rights. In fact, there is a rich body of case law
courts can consider today to help them determine how to balance so-
cial costs against the protection of rights.
The price society pays to protect rights is not limited to administra-
tive expenses. Maintenance and wear and tear costs are also a com-
mon cost of freedom of speech. Suppose a group wants to hold a rally
in an urban park to support more compassionate treatment of the
homeless and invites homeless people to participate in the event.
There will be litter and debris to clean up after the rally. Landscaping
may need to be repaired or restored. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any
expressive activity in a public park or street that will not result in
some after the fact expenses.
Further, there are direct, out of pocket financial costs and losses of
revenue to consider when expressive activities are permitted in public
places. A city will have to pay a lot of money in police overtime to
maintain order when the KKK wants to hold a rally in a black
neighborhood, or the Nazis plan to march through the streets of a
Jewish community like Skokie, Illinois. 194 When Operation Rescue or
another pro-life group holds protests outside of clinics providing
abortion services and pro-choice groups plan on holding counter dem-
onstrations as well, law enforcement costs may be substantial. 195 In-
193 Compare Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
("We are unaware of any 'free exercise' precedent for compelling government accommodation
of religious practices when that accommodation requires burdensome and constant official
supervision and management.") with United States v. Varley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22390
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2000) (describing monitoring program pursuant to which petitioner could
use marijuana for religious purposes during period of supervised release from incarceration).
194 See, e.g., Mathew Celia & Guy Taylor, 37 Arrested on Final Day of Protests, WASH.
TMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at B01 (reporting that three days of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian dem-
onstrations cost the District of Columbia five million dollars in police security expenses); Mark
Ferenchik, Demonstrations at City Hall May Soon Be Subject to Rules, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Oct 7, 2004, at 08C (acknowledging that Columbus incurred $127,896 in on-duty and overtime
police costs by providing security for week long demonstration by group opposed to abortion
and homosexuality); Matthew Marx, Police Prepare for KKK Rally, Counter Rally on Busy
Sunday, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 1999, at 3B (explaining that the 1999 Cleveland KKK
rally required twenty extra overtime police officers in addition to the regularly scheduled police
officers who also worked overtime).
195 See, e.g., Michele R. Moretti, Using Civil RICO To Battle Anti-Abortion Violence: Is
the Last Weapon in the Arsenal a Sword of Damocles?, 25 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1363, 1394
(1991) ("[E]xorbitant demands are being placed upon the limited resources of local govern-
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deed, the Supreme Court's case law suggests that communities cannot
reduce the financial costs of permitting expressive activities on public
property by charging the speakers sufficient fees to offset the pro-
jected expenses a municipality will incur in maintaining order at ral-
lies, protests, and other expressive events. The Court struck down
attempts to charge speakers' fees that will vary according to the city's
costs as content discriminatory in effect.'
96
Financial consequences may be indirect, but they may still turn out
to be substantial. Holding political rallies downtown may make it
harder for customers to shop at local businesses, reducing sales tax
income. Similar consequences may result from prolonged union
picketing. 197 Nor is it only the government that bears the burden of
protecting rights. In the free speech context, businesses lose revenue
when customers cannot get to stores and employees are late getting to
the office due to the congestion created by political rallies and
demonstrations.
Protecting rights other than freedom of speech can also result in
indirect financial consequences for private citizens or the general pub-
lic. If protecting the right to marry and to procreate requires states to
allow low income individuals who are already struggling to meet their
child support obligations from a previous marriage to marry again and
to start a new family, the children who depend on that child support
may find that the quality of their lives is at risk. Alternatively, the
states welfare obligations may increase.' 98 The list of examples could
go on and on.
ments who are repeatedly required to provide costly police protection at anti-abortion protest
rallies."); Bella English, Antiabortionists Go over the Edge, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1993, at
15 (describing estimates that the town of Brookline spent over $200,000 on police and jail
expenses responding to anti-abortion protests by Operation Rescue);.
16See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992).
197 See, e.g., Paul Zielbauer, Nursing Homes Are Locking Strikers out in Connecticut, N.Y.
TIMES, March 22, 2001, at BI (reporting that a one-week strike cost a nursing home an average
of $150,000 to $200,000 in additional costs); Transit Strike Looms as Deadline Passes, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 20, 2005, at C17 (reporting that a strike cost Chicago as much as $400 million a
day).
198 See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 187, at 135-36 (questioning whether "a deadbeat
father's right to marry trump[s] his moral responsibilities toward his child" and whether the fact
that "the community defrays the costs whenever children become public charges" justifies
"restrict[ing] the freedom of those who are morally and legally obligated to provide support").
The State of Wisconsin's attempt to condition obtaining a marriage license on the payment of
existing child support obligations was struck down in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 408
(1978), as an abridgement of the right to marry. To the extent that a new marriage reduces the
ability of recalcitrant fathers to meet their support obligation, the cost of recognizing that right
will be bome by the children of prior marriages or the state. See generally R. Michael Rogers,
Use of the Texas Marriage License Statutes as a Child Support Collection Device Does Not
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Moreover, more than financial costs may be involved. Large, pro-
tests outside of clinics providing abortion services traumatize patients
arriving for treatment, a result that may require the administration of
additional medication or increase the risks associated with the proce-
dure.199 The constitutionalization of defamation law may leave libeled
individuals without redress for the injuries done to their reputation. 200
Incitement and aggressive advocacy may not create risks of suffi-
ciently imminent unlawful conduct and violence to satisfy Branden-
burg, but it may increase the level of anti-social and harmful conduct
Violate Equal Protection, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1996) (discussing Zablocki).
199See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994) (noting state
court finding that patients with heightened anxiety show more resistance to analgesics and
require higher levels of sedation, which increases risks of surgery, and that some patients'
surgery had to be rescheduled because of extreme agitation); Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck,
67 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing how confrontational protests cause severe distress
that may lead to elevated blood pressure, hyperventilation, need for sedation, special counseling,
increased risk in operating room from anxiety induced agitation, delay, and risks associated with
delay); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Blythe, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
("This heightened level of anxiety [caused by picketing and demonstrations] has required that
abortion patients receive greater amounts of medication and has lengthened the time necessary
to perform abortion procedures, thereby increasing the risks to patients."); Hirsh v. City of
Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. 1991) (detailing how patients arrived at clinic in "a shaken
state" with elevated blood pressure and pulse rate, which subjected them to additional health
risks); Hearing on Violence at Women's Health Clinics Before the S. Appropriation Subcomm.
on Labor, Health & Human Services, 103d Cong. (1995) (statement of Kate Michelman,
President of National Abortion Rights Action League) (stating that increased anxiety from
encounters with confrontational protesters can result in need for more sedation during surgical
procedures, which increases medical risks); Warren M. Hem, Proxemics: The Application of
Theory to Conflict Arising from Antiabortion Demonstrations, 12 POPULATION & ENV'T 379,
380-81 (1991) (noting that on protest days, many patients "exhibited evidence of adrenergic
'fight-or-flight' reaction, such as pallor, shaking, sweating, pupillary dilation, palpitations,
hyperventilation, and urinary retention," and that if a patient becomes agitated before or during
the procedure "she could easily experience serious complications of the abortion that would be
extremely unlikely under other circumstances.").
200 As Justice White explained in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White, J., concurring), the Court's current doctrine may cause real harm
to defamed individuals. "[Tihe public official's complaint will be dismissed unless he alleges
and makes out a jury case of a knowing or reckless falsehood. Absent such proof, there will be
no jury verdict or judgment of any kind in his favor, even if the challenged publication is admit-
tedly false. The lie will stand, and the public continue to be misinformed about public mat-
ters .... Furthermore, when the plaintiff loses, the jury will likely return a general verdict and
there will be no judgment that the publication was false, even though it was without foundation
in reality. The public is left to conclude that the challenged statement was true after all." Id. at
767-68 (footnote omitted). See also Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLuM. L.
REv. 1321, 1326-27 (1992) (describing how a libeled public official's jury award of $22,000
against a newspaper found to be negligent in publishing false information that damaged his
reputation was overturned to prevent the press from being "excessively chilled in pursuit of
truth").
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that occurs over time.20 1 It is difficult to deny the obvious reality that
rights are often expensive political goods.
One response to these examples and others is that the rights com-
munities incur costs to protect and serve instrumental, not dignitary
goals. It is much more legitimate, one may argue, to require society to
pay to protect rights that serve social goals like the effective operation
of democracy (free speech) or accuracy in governmental decision-
making (procedural due process) than it is to force the public to incur
costs to protect dignitary rights, such as the free exercise of religion.
One cannot draw a useful analogy between free exercise cases and the
costs incurred in protecting other rights.
I think this argument is mistaken for three reasons. First, its basic
premise is overstated. Dignitary rights also have value that justifies
society incurring costs to protect them. It may be that rights serving
instrumental goals are more deserving of protection and warrant
greater social expenditures to guarantee them than dignitary interests.
I would not reject that contention out of hand. Even if that is true,
however, it does not preclude the argument that the constitutional
goal of protecting dignitary rights can also justify imposing some
significant costs on communities. Second, and related to the first
point, some of the examples described above do involve the protec-
tion of dignitary rights. The right to marry is a dignitary right. The
compelled affirmation and belief doctrine primarily serves dignitary,
not instrumental goals.202 There is a dignitary dimension to procedural
due process as well as an instrumental function served by this guaran-
tee.20 3 The right to be heard has value even if it does not serve an in-
strumental function and persuades the decision maker to change his
mind. Personal dignity is a core aspect of equal protection jurispru-
dence. Race and gender classifications are often problematic precisely
because they are an affront to the dignity of the individual.2°4 We re-
201 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE 266-69, 273-74
(1989); John C. Knechtle, When To Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 539, 570
(2006) (deploring the inability of police to prevent violence incited by hate speech because
under Brandenburg only speech that incites imminent violence can be suppressed).
202 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (recognizing that forcing an in-
dividual "to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable... 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit' that the Constitution protects
from official interference); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
"3 see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (ex-
plaining that procedural due process requirements affirm human dignity by expressing "the
elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is
done with one").
204See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (striking down race-based peremptory
challenges because of the "stigma or dishonor [that] results if a prosecutor uses the raw fact of
skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror"); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
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ject administratively convenient laws employing gender classifica-
tions that reinforce antiquated gender stereotypes, for example, to
protect and affirm the dignity and status of men and women, not to
accomplish some ulterior objective.20 5 Third, as I argued earlier, free
exercise rights do further important instrumental goals.2 °  Thus, at
least with regard to protecting the autonomy of religious institutions,
society gains instrumental benefits by protecting free exercise rights,
which can be balanced against the right protecting costs such protec-
tion incurs.
To be sure, drawing analogies, when appropriate, between the
costs we accept to protect other rights and the costs of granting ex-
emptions to accommodate religious practices does not eliminate judi-
cial subjectivity in free exercise cases. There is no exact equivalence
among rights and the state interests that justify their abridgement. It
should be remembered, however, that the goal here is not to entirely
eliminate subjectivity in adjudicating free exercise claims. It is to
provide sufficient guidelines and reference points so that the balanc-
ing that remains to be done is not completely ad hoc and involves no
more judicial discretion than is generally accepted in other areas of
constitutional law.
Given that caveat, there is no shortage of persuasive analogies that
courts may consider. In some cases, the primary burden in granting a
free exercise exemption is the same kind of administrative
inconvenience that government confronts in protecting speech. If
children of minority faiths attending public school have a free
exercise right to be excused from school so that they may observe
religious holidays of their faith, public schools will incur
administrative costs in keeping track of those holidays and taking
steps to mitigate the impact of the absences, such as proctoring make-
up exams. Since courts routinely require the state to incur such costs
in protecting speech and equality rights, even under intermediate
standards of review, courts may reasonably presume that the state's
interest in avoiding this kind of administrative inconvenience is an
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (denouncing racially segregated schools because of their impact on
the "hearts and minds" of black children).
2 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (insisting that a "gender-based
generalization [about the respective needs of widows and widowers] cannot suffice to justify the
denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to
their families' support"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) ("[Our statute
books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.").
206 See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
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insufficient justification for burdening rights in free exercise cases as
well.
It is also easy enough to hypothesize free exercise scenarios that
involve maintenance and wear and tear costs that are comparable to
those resulting from protected speech activities. Instead of a political
rally urging compassionate government responses to the plight of the
homeless, local houses of worship might ask the city for permission
to use a local park as a one time site for the distribution of food and
clothing to the homeless. This religiously motivated charitable
activity is not expressive in nature. Accordingly, the houses of
worship would have to rely on the Free Exercise Clause rather than
the Free Speech Clause if local administrators refused to allow them
to use the park for their program. If local officials could not reject a
permit application for a political rally projected to cause roughly
similar maintenance and wear and tear costs because of freedom of
speech concerns, it is hard to see why courts cannot use that same
constitutional balancing analysis for guidance in reviewing an
analogous free exercise claim.
Alternatively, some requests for religious exemptions may cost the
government money or cause it to lose revenue. If public employees
request time off to observe religious holidays, the city may have to
pay other workers overtime to work as substitutes for their absent
colleagues.2 °7 That financial cost can be analogized to various free
speech examples. Alternatively, a city may not allow a house of wor-
ship to locate in an area zoned for commercial uses-because the
house of worship will not bring in sales tax revenue. Again, if cases
suggest that we accept costs of this nature and magnitude in protect-
ing freedom of speech, courts should be able to take that knowledge
into account in determining whether such costs justify interfering with
the exercise of religion.
c. Using Costs That Society Accepts To Protect Interests Other than
Rights To Evaluate the Weight Assigned to State Interests
In line with the other analogies discussed above, the interests the
state and the public routinely give up to promote objectives other than
the protection of rights should provide some relevant background to
an analysis of whether those same interests can justify the abridge-
m7See, e.g., United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976) (reject-
ing plaintiffs religious accommodation request that he be relieved of the obligation to work on
Saturday, his Sabbath, because hiring a substitute employee would require the payment of
overtime wages).
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ment of free exercise rights. This kind of an analysis may involve
considerable judicial discretion, but it provides additional objective
reference points that can reduce the subjectivity and indeterminacy of
a balancing test.2
8
Land use regulations provide several useful examples. There is no
doubt that locating a house of worship in a residential neighborhood
can create externalities for neighbors. There may be increased traffic,
noise, competition for parking on the street, and other problems. It is
also obvious, however, that houses of worship are not the only land
uses that result in increased traffic or noise in residential neighbor-
hoods. When land use authorities are willing to permit an athletic club
or a fraternity house in residential neighborhoods, but refuse to allow
houses of worship of similar size in these areas, courts have some
basis from which they can evaluate the city's claim that its interest in
limiting such negative externalities should be assigned significant
weight.2° Similarly, in a community where two story homes, office
208 Using the request for an accommodation for the ritual use of peyote, the specific issue
in Smith itself, as an example of how this kind of a judicial analysis could be employed by
courts with regard to the risk that an accommodation might result in an increase in the unauthor-
ized use of peyote, Catherine Cookson describes in considerable detail the range of "practitio-
ners" who may be registered to use drugs prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act in their
professional roles. She goes on to explain the controls and procedures provided in the statue to
monitor and evaluate the use of controlled substances by registered practitioners to ensure that
no misuse of the exemption occurs. COOKSON, supra note 22, at 132-33. Cookson concludes
that "[tihese controls provide 'neutral' criteria for reducing the spread of controlled drugs into
uncontrolled areas of use. Theoretically they could be made applicable to, and would be effec-
tive in, controlling such spread whether the use was in a five-hundred-bed major hospital with
several thousand employees, or in a religious ceremony supervised by a registered 'road man' of
the Native American Church." Id. at 133.
With regard to the state of Oregon's interest in avoiding the alleged health hazards that re-
suit from the ingestion of a hallucinogenic drug by the user himself, whatever his or her motiva-
tion in using the drug may be, Cookson draws a different analogy. Noting that Oregon "permits
individuals to engage in such risky activities as tobacco smoking, consuming alcohol and coffee,
gun ownership, hunting, motorcycling, rodeo riding, rock climbing, spelunking, hang gliding,
football, and flying ultralights," she wonders why, "[o]ne is free to undertake such dangerous
activities as these and risk the consequences; however, one will be punished by the state for
practicing one's religion because the state believes that the religious worship has dangerous side
effects which can cause harm to the religious believer." Id. at 134.
A somewhat similar analysis was employed by the court in Rader v. Johnson, 924 F. Supp.
1540 (D. Neb. 1996). Here, plaintiff sought an exemption from the University of Nebraska-
Keamey's (UNK) residence policy requiring freshman students to live on campus. In deternin-
ing that the UNK's justifications for denying the exemption were insufficiently compelling, the
court noted that UNK had granted exemptions to a large number of students for an extraordinar-
ily broad range of reasons. Thus, the court concluded that UNK's "own implementation of its...
rule undercuts any contention that its interest is compelling." Id. at 1557. Moreover, the fact that
other branches of the University of Nebraska system did not enforce a similar rule further un-
dermined the alleged importance of UNK's policy. Id. at 1557 n.3.
209 See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1219-20, 1234-
35 (11 th Cir. 2004) (reviewing ordinance excluding houses of worship from business district in
which theaters, restaurants, private clubs, lodge halls, health clubs, dance studios, music instruc-
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buildings, and businesses are commonplace, courts may look skepti-
cally at the argument that a house of worship cannot be over one story
in height because of the burden the extra story would impose on the
privacy interests of neighbors.
The suggested analysis here needs to be distinguished from a dif-
ferent kind of free exercise argument presented by a few courts and
commentators. Some scholars argue that the fact that the government
creates exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability for
secular interests justifies the application of strict scrutiny review
when the states refuse to grant comparable exemptions for religious
practices.210 This analysis builds on the language in Smith that distin-
guishes Sherbert v. Verner2l and its progeny from the rule denying
religious individuals any free exercise protection against neutral laws
of general applicability. In cases in which the government provides
individualized exemptions to its regulation to secular interests, the
Court explained, the regulation can no longer be considered a neutral
law of general applicability. Accordingly, the refusal to extend an
exemption to religious practices comparable to exemptions granted to
secular interests must be rigorously reviewed.1 2
In the best known case that adopts this position, Fraternal Order
of Police v. City of Newark,213 the Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny
to the application of two Muslim officers for an exemption from a
police department grooming standard that required officers to be
clean shaven. The department had created a categorical exemption
from its requirements for officers who suffered a skin condition that
tion studios, modeling schools, and schools of athletic instruction are permitted uses); Vineyard
Christian Fellowship v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (N.D. IM. 2003) (reviewing
ordinance that excludes houses of worship from zoning district in which cultural facilities,
theatres, hotels, and restaurants are permitted); Love Church v. City of Evanston, 671 F. Supp.
515, 518-19 (N.D. 111. 1987) (prohibiting churches from locating in zones where meeting halls,
theaters, schools, funeral parlors, and community centers are permitted), vacated on other
grounds, 896 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1990); Refuge Temple Ministries v. City of Forest Park, No.
1:01-CV-0958-MHS (N.D. Ga. filed Mar. 14, 2002) (requiring a special permit for churches in
area in which private clubs, lodges, theatres, and auditoriums are permitted without such a
permit). For a synopsis of the Refuge Temple case, see The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
Refuge Temple Ministries of Atlanta v. City of Forest Park, www.becketfund.org/index.php/
case/71.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). See also Laycock, supra note 125 (describing survey
data suggesting that houses of worship are treated less favorably in many zoning districts than a
broad range of other uses including banquet halls, clubs, community centers, fraternal organiza-
tions, health clubs, and theaters).21O See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lu-
kumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).
211374 U.S. 398 (1963).
212 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
213 170 F.3d 359 (1999).
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prevented them from shaving for medical reasons. However, it re-
fused to provide a similar exemption for the Muslim officers who
claimed that they are religiously obligated to grow their beards. The
court reviewed the department's decision to provide a medical ex-
emption, but not a religious exemption, under strict scrutiny and
struck it down.214
Unlike the Fraternal Order of Police court, I am not suggesting
that the granting of secular exemptions increases the rigor of the stan-
dard of review courts should apply when religious exemptions are
denied. Unless the government clearly discriminates against religion
or specific religions, I see no reason why the state's use of formal or
informal exemptions to protect secular interests should determine the
standard of review to be applied in free exercise cases.21 5 Looking at
exemptions to general laws provided to secular interests serves a dif-
ferent purpose than determining the standard of review to be applied.
Exemptions for secular interests are relevant because they provide
objective information courts can consider in doing the constitutional
balancing required in adjudicating a case-under whatever standard
of review is applied. A record of granting related exemptions to secu-
lar interests provides information that will help a court to evaluate and
weigh the state's reasons for denying a religious exemption-and this
is a task courts will have to perform under any meaningful standard of
review.
Thus, in Fraternal Order of Police, it would be appropriate for a
court to take into account the fact the police department grants medi-
cal exemptions to its grooming policy when determining the weight to
be assigned to the interests the state asserts to justify its policy. Since
protecting the health of public employees is generally considered an
extremely important interest, however, the existence of the medical
exemption is of relatively limited use to religious plaintiffs or to the
216court. 16 It would only demonstrate that the state interest in maintain-ing its grooming policy could be outweighed by compelling compet-
214 Id at 365-66.
215 Unlike judges and commentators who try to use the limited exceptions described in
Smith as the foundation for protecting free exercise rights in limited circumstances, I believe the
core holding in Smith that the free exercise clause provides no protection against neutral laws of
general applicability is mistaken and should be overruled. Free exercise rights deserve some
level of protection against neutral laws of general applicability whether the state grants secular
exemptions to those laws or not. False Messiahs, supra note 19, at 193-203.
216 Courts generally have not concluded that the availability of controlled substances for
medical research or treatment requires a constitutionally mandated exemption for the use of the
same substance for religious purposes. See, e.g., Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1463 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Vermont v. Rocheleau, 451 A.2d 1144, 1148 n.3 (Vt. 1982).
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ing interests. That finding would not assist a court adjudicating a free
exercise claim under some intermediate level standard of review. It
would certainly not suggest that the state's interests were unimportant
or superficial. Clearly, proof by plaintiffs that the state granted ex-
emptions from its grooming policies for trivial secular interests would
be more helpful to their cause. That evidence would undermine the
state's claim that the uniform enforcement of its grooming policy
furthered interests of significant value.
d. The Possibility of Cost Spreading
In many of the examples described above, courts are asked to
balance the burden on the exercise of religion resulting from the
application of a general law against some cost that the state (or the
public) will incur if an exemption to the law is granted. The balancing
analysis becomes more one-sided and more difficult to resolve in
favor of granting an exemption if the consequence of doing so causes
some significant harm to specific individuals or the members of a
discrete class. These are the hardest claims for an exemption to
sustain. Why should important interests of some persons who do not
accept the tenets of the faith at issue be subordinated, or sacrificed, in
order to enable other persons to freely practice that faith without
interference? Why should we deny the protection or benefits provided
by general rules of law to certain individuals solely because the
enforcement of the law on their behalf happens to conflict with the
religious practices of other persons? Everyone else within the
coverage of a statute receives the protection or benefits to which they
are entitled. Only certain individuals do not, and they alone bear the
entire cost of the exemption.
One way to deal with this issue is for courts to consider the
availability of cost spreading to generalize the cost of granting the
exemption. Instead of a serious cost being inflicted on a relatively few
individuals, a much smaller burden is distributed among a far larger
class of persons-usually the general public. If the cost of granting an
exemption is shifted from specific individuals to the general public,
the balancing analysis in free exercise cases is more appropriately
analogized to the kinds of judicial balancing that occurs when other
rights are at issue, as the free speech cases described earlier
demonstrate. In those cases, the courts were often willing to protect
the right notwithstanding the resulting costs. Their propensity for
doing so creates an objective background for reaching similar
conclusions in evaluating free exercise claims.
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The justification for considering cost spreading as part of the bal-
ancing process is straightforward. Constitutional guarantees, such as
freedom of speech or freedom of religion, are public, political goods.
The price for protecting them should be paid by the community at
large. The argument here is not all that different from the argument
used to defend the Fifth Amendment's mandate requiring government
to pay just compensation to owners when it "takes" their private
property for public use. Government should not force "some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.,
217
For an example of how cost spreading might be utilized in a free
exercise case, we can go back to the Catholic Charities case, dis-
cussed previously.2 18 Arguing that Catholic Charities' claim would be
unsuccessful even under strict scrutiny review, the California Su-
preme Court held that the state's decision to apply the Women's Con-
traception Equity Act (WCEA) to Catholic charitable institutions was
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating
gender discrimination. Central to the Court's decision was its conclu-
sion that "any exemption from the WCEA sacrifices the affected
women's interest in receiving equitable treatment with respect to
health benefits. 219 If an exemption was granted, female employees of
Catholic Charities would not receive the insurance coverage that they
would otherwise be entitled to under the statute-a benefit female
employees of other organizations would receive by force of law.
Thus, providing an exemption to Catholic Charities would materially
burden a discrete and limited class. No prior judicial decision, the
Court asserted, "has exempted a religious objector from the operation
of a neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that the
requested exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of third
parties. 2
20
It would not be difficult to spread this burden from those employ-
ees of Catholic Charities who wanted insurance coverage for medical
contraceptives to a much broader class, however. The state could or-
ganize and fund a separate insurance pool for employees from relig-
iously exempt organizations. Given the small number of employees in
question and the relatively minor cost of the insurance coverage, the
resulting burden on each California taxpayer would be de minimis.
Further, since Catholic Charities could be asked to increase its contri-
217 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).218 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
219 Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93 (Cal. 2004).
2
0Id. at 94.
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butions to other parts of its programs that served the public good,
and these contributions might well reduce the state's welfare expendi-
tures in caring for those in need, the alleged financial burden on the
state could turn out to be a wash. The cost of paying for supplemental
insurance coverage for employees of Catholic Charities would be
largely offset by Catholic Charities taking on additional responsibili-
ties for aiding the indigent that would otherwise be the responsibility
of the state.
Catholic Charities presented at least the first part of this argument,
regarding public financing of insurance coverage for the employees of
exempt organizations, to the California Supreme Court. The Court
rejected it out of hand-indicating that no authority required "the
state to subsidize private religious practices. 222 Of course, Catholic
Charities was not asking the state to subsidize its religious practices.
In enacting WCEA, the state was trying to further a secular public
good at minimal expense by imposing the cost of doing so on private
employers, including religious organizations. The kind of cost spread-
ing suggested here does not involve the public subsidizing of reli-
gious practices.
Moreover, as we have seen, the state is often required to incur ex-
penses in order to allow other rights such as freedom of speech to be
exercised.223 Similarly, avoiding expense and administrative incon-
venience cannot justify the use of suspect classifications in equal pro-
tection cases. 224 The California Supreme Court may be correct that
there are no cases that require the state to accept such costs as a con-
sequence of protecting the free exercise of religion. But that statement
is hardly self-justifying in light of the jurisprudence of other constitu-
tional guarantees. If we are going to take free exercise rights seri-
ously, in the same sense that we do other rights, it is not at all clear
why the exercise of this right may only be protected from government
interference when there are no public costs involved in doing so.
Once it is understood that there is nothing presumptively unaccept-
able about incurring public expenses to protect rights, cost spreading
becomes a useful tool for transforming the nature of the harm an ex-
emption causes to one that the state may reasonably be obliged to
accept.
221 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for the discussion of how such payments
eliminate the secular benefit that would result from granting an exemption and avoid the privi-
leging of religion.
2m Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 94.
223 See supra notes 186-89, 194-97 and accompanying text.
n4 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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e. Institutional Channeling and Personal Inducements
As noted earlier, a commonly expressed concern about providing
any kind of serious protection to free exercise rights is the contention
that exemptions from general laws will induce people to practice re-
ligion or espouse a particular faith. 225 Additionally, at the institutional
level, exempting religious institutions such as schools, day care cen-
ters, and recreational programs from the regulatory burden their secu-
lar counterparts must obey will allow them to provide less costly,
more efficient, and more cohesive services than their secular competi-
tors. These exemption-based advantages, it is argued, will channel
individuals toward religious providers and unfairly promote religion
at the expense of other private institutions .226
At the individual level, there are many situations when such claims
would have little validity. Many religious obligations are materially
problematic, no matter how spiritually meaningful they may be to the
devout believer. It is hard to imagine a non-Jewish person, for exam-
ple, being tempted to join Jews in spending a day fasting at worship
services because Jewish colleagues receive a day off from work or
school to observe Yom Kippur. Few parents of other faiths would
seek to be free from laws requiring the provision of medical care to
their children because exemptions from such mandates were made
available to Christian Scientists. Other accommodations, however,
such as conscientious objector exemptions from conscription, or al-
lowing workers weekend days off to observe the Sabbath, have real
material value. If the price for getting a Sunday off from work rather
than a Wednesday is formal affiliation with a church and occasional
attendance at services, some employees may be influenced by the
availability of such an accommodation to change their behavior, if not
their beliefs. Certainly, the attraction of joining a pacifist faith in time
of war should be self-evident.
Much of the power of such accommodations to induce changes in
religious behavior or affiliation would be mitigated by conditioning
exemptions on the religious believer accepting obligations that reduce
the secular benefit received. The utility and administrability of these
kinds of requirements have been discussed previously.227 Even if the
conditions accompanying an exemption substantially reduce its
secular value, however, there may still be situations in which the
availability of an exemption can influence individuals to undertake
2
2 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
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and espouse particular religious commitments. Conscientious objector
status, for example, may constitute an inducement for some persons
to affiliate with pacifist faiths even if it is conditioned on the
performance of alternative service.
The fact that an exemption continues to have some force as an in-
ducement does not necessarily require that a court reject it, however.
Instead, the power of an exemption to induce religious belief and
practice should be part of the balancing analysis a court undertakes in
adjudicating a free exercise claim. In performing that balancing
analysis, courts should not only consider the extent to which an ex-
emption motivates people to join or practice a religion; they must also
recognize that the denial of an exemption will have a contrary influ-
ence on religious behavior and belief. If members of pacifist faiths
know that they must either confront imprisonment if they adhere to
their religious beliefs and resist conscription or violate the obligations
of their faith by serving in the military, surely the burdens of that pre-
dicament would serve to discourage continued adherence to the faith
or undermine new interest in the religion by non-believers, at least to
some extent.228
f Sham and Feigned Claims for an Exemption
One of the arguments commonly raised against constitutionally
mandated religious exemptions is that some individuals will falsely
claim that a law they do not wish to obey imposes a burden on their
religious beliefs and practices. Accordingly, these religious imposters
will insist that they need not obey the law in question. Thus, critics
claim that if exemptions are mandated, beliefs a person does not
really hold in a religion that does not really exist may become consti-
tutional tools that can be used all too easily by unscrupulous persons
or institutions to avoid unpleasant regulatory obligations.229
It is a fair point, but again the scope of the problem is certainly ex-
aggerated. First, there are often common sense costs that will discour-
age many people from feigning a claim for religious exemption. It is
easy for those opposed to courts granting free exercise exemptions to
make up bizarre hypotheticals involving sham claims and fake relig-
ions. We can imagine a public employee insisting that he worships
the San Francisco Giants baseball team, that he practices his faith by
attending all their Saturday and Sunday home games, and, therefore,
228 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 347
(1996).
229 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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that he must be exempt from weekend work assignments. But does
anyone seriously believe that an employee is going to demand such an
exemption from his boss? The ill will that would be directed at the
employee by his colleagues and supervisors in response to the de-
mand would discourage all but the most foolhardy from even broach-
ing the subject. Nor have false claims of membership in recognized
faiths proven to be a serious problem. The overwhelming number of
potential draftees, for example, do not join pacifist faiths in an at-
tempt to avoid conscription.2 30 Put simply, there are informal con-
straints on false attempts to obtain religious exemptions that limit the
scope of this problem.
Second, an organization that insists that it is sufficiently religious
to claim free exercise exemptions for its work may well render itself
ineligible for a variety of government subsidies that might otherwise
be available to it. Establishment Clause restrictions on the public
funding of religious institutions may cause some organizations
operating under a pretense of religiosity to carefully consider their
position. This is another one of the ways that a vigorously enforced
Establishment Clause can provide a constitutional background that
facilitates the rigorous protection of free exercise rights.23'
Third, the conditioning of exemptions on steps that mitigate or
eliminate the secular value of the exemption will make sham claims
for exemptions considerably less attractive. The adherent of the San
Francisco Giants faith, for example, may be much less interested in
insisting on getting weekend days off if his salary is reduced to take
account of the material advantages he would receive from the exemp-
tion. When religion is not materially privileged by the granting of
exemptions, there should be far less incentive to game the system to
obtain them.
Still, sham claims cannot be completely prevented and the possi-
bility that they will be asserted should not be entirely discounted. It is
a cost for courts to take into account in determining the availability of
exemptions. Given the current number of statutory accommodations
in place that might induce sham claims for exemptions, but do not
230 During World War I and World War 1, the ratio of conscientious objector exemptions
to actual induction stayed low and steady. World War I saw 0.14 exemptions per 100 inductions
while World War II saw 0.15 such exemptions. STEPHEN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRAFT LAW VIOLATORS, 1658-1985 93 (1986). The later years of the
Vietnam War saw a dramatic rise in the rate of conscientious objector exemptions to the stag-
gering ratio of 130.72 exemptions per 100 inductions in 1972. Id. However, this phenomenon
was sui generis and represented the widespread and violent unpopularity of the war by this time
rather than a general rise in the use of religion to gain exemptions. Id. at 73-95.
231 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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seem to be creating a serious problem, however, the presumptive
force of this general argument should be rejected.232 If this contention
is to be taken into account in judicial balancing, the state must dem-
onstrate that there is some reason to believe that a substantial number
of false claims will be asserted if a specific exemption is granted-
and that administrative authorities and the courts will not be able to
adequately evaluate them.
233
g. Substantial Compliance
A final challenge to using a balancing test to evaluate free exercise
claims is the alleged uncompromising nature of religious obligations.
With other rights, such as freedom of speech, for example, it is possi-
ble to talk about different ways to exercise the right. Thus, a law that
restricts a particular time, place, or manner of expression may only
marginally interfere with the speaker's ability to communicate his
message. Other venues or means of expression may be available that
allow a court to uphold a speech regulation without substantially in-
terfering with anyone's ability to speak to their intended audience.
This analysis has been formalized in the review of content-neutral
speech regulations to require courts to consider the existence of alter-
native avenues of communication when they review a challenged
restriction.2 4
When free exercise rights are at issue, however, such constitutional
compromises seem less likely or even possible. One may argue that
religious mandates are absolute. Nothing short of literal obedience is
acceptable. Thus when free exercise claims are adjudicated, there is
nothing for the court to consider on the free exercise side of the scale.
Only the state's interests are susceptible to any kind of probing in-
quiry concerning less restrictive alternatives. The religious liberty
claim is fixed and immutable. Indeed, the state is fully justified in
maintaining that any attempt to work out a compromise with bur-
dened believers would be futile since no give and take between the
232GEDICKS, supra note 105, at 41-42 ("It has never been shown that false claims of reli-
gious belief are a serious enforcement problem, despite the Court's refusal to examine the
reasonableness of particular beliefs .... Even in the area of tax law, where claims for exemp-
tion coincide with financial self-interest, neither the IRS nor the Court seems to have been
unduly hindered by free exercise considerations.").
233 See People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 818-19 (Cal. 1964); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963).
2m See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988).
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parties is possible. The only way religious liberty can be protected is
if the state capitulates and grants the desired exemption.
Again, while there is some truth to this concern, the above descrip-
tion presents an exaggerated picture of the problem. To begin with,
religious exemptions can be conditioned on the exempt individual or
organization disgorging whatever secular benefit accompanies an
accommodation. However literal a religious obligation may be, in
most cases it will not prohibit the religious individual from providing
the government something of value to offset the material advantage
conferred by an exemption.
Moreover, many regulations do not directly prohibit or interfere
with religious practices. Instead, they increase the cost or convenience
of conduct that is an important preparatory step toward satisfying a
religious obligation. Here, there may be a range of alternative ways to
facilitate religious practice. To take one obvious example, there may
be several different sites in a community on which a religious
congregation might develop a house of worship. The group's
religious beliefs may not suggest a preference for one location over
another- although secular concerns regarding parking, convenience,
and cost may make one option more attractive than another. This is an
area where courts may properly inquire into the alternatives available
to the congregation to satisfy its need for a site for communal
worship.235
Religious mandates may also involve more flexibility than they
initially appear to, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that they are
susceptible to a broader range of interpretations than initially seems
apparent.236 That flexibility may make it far easier for the state to
grant an exemption than would otherwise be the case. In Mayweath-
235 See HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 102-03 (arguing that it does not substantially burden
the exercise of religion to deny a congregation permission to construct a house of worship on a
particular site when numerous alternative locations are available to it); see generally Messiah
Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 825-26 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that a
religious congregation has no right to build "its house of worship where it pleases").
236 For example, Orthodox Jews are prohibited from pushing or carrying objects outside
the home on the Sabbath. This mandate makes it difficult for women with small children, the
elderly who rely on canes and walkers to be mobile, and others to attend Synagogue services.
Rabbinic tradition, however, resolves this problem by allowing for the extension of what consti-
tutes the home through the creation of an eruv, a ceremonially designated area that can encom-
pass a large area within which most of the members of the congregation live. See Tenafly Erv
Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 152 (3rd Cir. 2002). The creation of an eruv by
attaching boundary markers to utility poles has resulted in competing establishment clause and
free exercise claims, see id., as well as political disputes, see Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, Ortho-
dox Berkeley Synagogue Finds Way To Ease Sabbath Rules, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 7, 2006, at
Al.
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L, W REVIEW
ers v. Terhune,2 37 for example, plaintiffs, Muslim prisoners incarcer-
ated in California, brought a RLUIPA action against a prison policy
requiring inmates to be clean-shaven and prohibiting beards of any
length--on the grounds that the regulation interfered with their reli-
gious obligation to wear beards. The state based its refusal to grant
the plaintiff class a religious exemption on security grounds. Prison-
ers could hide weapons and contraband in a beard. Further, a prisoner
with a beard could quickly alter his appearance in a way that could
make it easier for him to escape or more difficult to apprehend after
an escape.
These arguments might be persuasive if plaintiffs' religious obli-
gations required them to wear long beards of many inches in length.
Testimony at trial from religious leaders demonstrated, however, that
having a one half inch beard satisfied plaintiffs' religious obliga-
238tions. As the federal court adjudicating the case recognized, permit-
ting this limited exception to the prison's grooming standards would
have little bearing on security concerns. Nothing can be hidden in a
one half inch beard and shaving a very short beard would not alter an
inmate's appearance enough to allow him to elude capture.239
Indeed, sometimes the literal statement of a religious obligation is
exactly what creates some flexibility in obeying it. Many Orthodox
Jews, for example, interpret Jewish law literally, as prohibiting shav-
ing with a razor. This specific constraint allows them to shave with a
scissor or with an electric razor (which is more like a scissor than an
actual razor in its operation). 240
Of course, the religious interpretations described above are not
universally accepted. The fact that some members of a religious group
accept one interpretation of religious obligations does not allow the
state to insist that other members of the same faith should be willing
to follow suit. The U.S. Army, for example, does not allow military
personnel, including chaplains, to wear beards. While this is not a
problem for many Jews, some clergy, such as Chabad Lubavitch
Rabbis, believe that all forms of shaving are prohibited. Accordingly,
they cannot comply with military regulations and serve as chap-
lains.241 The army's refusal to grant an exemption to Chabad Rabbis
237 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
238 Id. at 1090-91.
239 Id. at 1095.
m Nathaniel Popper, Beard Ban Deters Chabad Rabbis from Becoming Chaplains in
Army, FORWARD, Aug. 26, 2005, at 1.
241 Id.
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cannot be justified by reference to other religious Jews who interpret
Halacha (Jewish law) differently. 242
The possibility that religious commitments may be sufficiently
flexible to permit partial or limited compliance with state mandates or
a compromise between religious plaintiffs and the state provides indi-
rect support for a free exercise doctrine that employs some form of a
balancing test. Since courts have neither the competence nor the au-
thority to impose a compromise on religious individuals, the burden
of suggesting a form of compliance with religious obligations that
interferes less seriously with the state's interest will fall, necessarily,
on the religious plaintiff. A standard of review that assigns some
weight to the religious plaintiffs interest can only encourage consid-
eration of such potential opportunities for compromise. Because the
state's power to reject proposed solutions is not unlimited and will be
subject to some level of judicial review, government actors should be
more willing to consider exemptions that satisfy most, if not all, of
their concerns. Correspondingly, one would expect that religious in-
dividuals would be more willing to consider and offer compromises if
they knew that the state could not reject their proposals capriciously.
3. Location Matters
Rights do not receive the same level of protection in all locations.
For example, the right to be free from warrantless searches is more
243
aggressively protected in one's home than in one's car. The home
also plays a role in determining the scope of the right to privacy or
personal autonomy. Part of the justification for striking down laws
prohibiting the sale or use of contraceptives was a concern about po-
lice invading the sanctity of the marital bedroom. 244
242 Indeed, under the analysis proposed in this article, it might be difficult for the army to
justify its refusal to grant an exemption to Chabad Rabbis under any reasonable standard of
review. There is an acknowledged shortage of Jewish chaplains in the army. Id. The army
claims it cannot exempt chaplains from the grooming requirement because beards prevent
personnel from effectively using gas masks. But bearded rabbis in the Israeli Army seem to
have no difficulty in donning gas masks and a few bearded military personnel in the U.S. Army,
who joined up when the army granted religious exemptions to its grooming policy, have been
allowed to stay in the service. Id.
243 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985) ("[Ihe guaranty of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed .. . as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling, house, or other
structure ... and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile." (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925))). See generally David A. Harris, Car Wars: The
Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 556 (1998) (arguing
against the erosion of Fourth Amendment protections in cases involving cars, their drivers, and
their passengers).2
" See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Location is also a critical factor in determining the appropriate
standard of review and the application of that standard of review in
free speech cases. Speech regulations that restrict expressive activities
in a street or a park (a traditional public forum) or private property are
reviewed more rigorously than regulations of expressive activities in
other public property that has not been deliberately opened up for
discussion and debate (a nonpublic forum). 245 Further, the connection
between expression and a person's home has special significance in a
range of free speech cases. Possession of obscene material that may
be the subject of prosecution elsewhere is protected by the First
Amendment in a home library.246 Speech emanating from the home,
such as a sign in one's window or in the front yard, is assigned greater
weight than speech expressed in other locations.247 Accordingly, the
state must assert a stronger interest to justify regulating such expres-
sion. Also, the state's interest in protecting the sanctuary of the home
against unwanted intrusions by sexually graphic or otherwise indecent
expression justifies abridgements of speech that would otherwise be
impermissible.24 s Thus, in a sense, the individual's right not to listen
or to be exposed to speech, as well as the individual's right to speak
or read, receives special recognition in the home as opposed to other
more public locations.
Location can also be taken into account in developing doctrine to
protect the free exercise of religion. As is true for other rights, a fam-
ily's home deserves special recognition as a location where religious
practices can take place free from state interference. A state may rea-
sonably prohibit adults from offering alcoholic beverages to minors in
business settings or places of public accommodation. But a police raid
on a family's Passover Seder where children might be offered wine to
drink as part of the ceremony should require special justification. Of
course, this does not mean that religious activities in the home are
24
.
5
nt'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992) (explaining
that under the Court's forum analysis, "regulation of speech on government property [e.g.,
streets and parks] that has traditionally been available for public expression is subject to the
highest scrutiny" while speech regulations limiting expression on most other public property
"must survive only a much more limited review").
246See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
247 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (explaining that speech emanating
from the home is special because "[d]isplaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a
message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or
picture by other means").
21 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (recognizing
that while "we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objection-
able speech and other sound," this does not mean that "a mailer's right to communicate" over-
rides the interests of "an unreceptive addressee" in his own home).
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absolutely immune from state regulation. The level of review that
laws burdening religious practice in the home should receive remains
an open question. There is reason to argue, however, that it should be
a more rigorous standard than one applied to laws that burden reli-
gious practice in the public square.
In addition to recognizing the special status of the home, courts
should provide distinctive protection to activities that occur within a
house of worship. Simply as a matter of constitutional common sense,
it would be more than anomalous for courts to respect the sanctuary
of the home,249 while refusing to respect the sanctity of an actual
sanctuary. Further, the case for providing heightened protection for
houses of worship can be grounded on several considerations. The
people involved in activities at this location will almost certainly be
adherents of the same faith. It is also apparent that most of what oc-
curs in a house of worship is imbued with religious meaning. Thus,
this is a location where the exercise of religion is a paramount and
pervasive concern. The idea of collective autonomy has much more
meaning here than it would for a more heterogeneous association. The
interest of outsiders or the government in controlling what goes on is
limited and secondary in many cases. Finally, houses of worship fur-
ther the instrumental functions of organized religion. They operate as
the center of distinct communal activities and engage congregants in
the discussion, development, and transmission of moral values. They
need some level of immunity from state interference if they are going
to serve as the source of independently determined values that may
operate as a counterweight to government perspectives.
Conversely, religious activities outside of the home and houses of
worship should receive less protection. The argument here is not that
religious activities belong in the home or house of worship
exclusively and should not take place in more public settings. There is
no reason to presume that providing special protection to religious
activities in the home or church requires as a corollary principle a rule
limiting opportunities for religious activities in the public square.
Certainly, no such connection exists in free speech doctrine. No one
thinks the special status the courts assign to the home for free speech
purposes somehow suggests that expressive activities should not be
permitted anywhere else in the public square. Rather, as is true for
free speech doctrine, recognizing that the home is a unique sanctuary
for religious practice and observance increases the protection
249 Id.; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
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religious exercise receives in the home; it does not diminish the
protection religious conduct receives in other locations.
It may be, however, that regulations limiting the exercise of relig-
ion on publicly owned property used by government for particular
purposes should be subjected to distinctively lenient scrutiny. Again,
there is a strong parallel to free speech doctrine and the modest re-
view of laws restricting speech in a nonpublic forum. While it may be
reasonable to assume that what transpires in a house of worship is of
distinctive spiritual significance to the members of the congregation
in question, and is of less obvious importance to outsiders or the state,
the opposite presumption applies to public property on which ongoing
governmental operations occur.250 Exemptions from general regula-
tions on public property being used to serve specific public purposes
are likely to interfere with government functions and may limit the
utility of the property for nonbelievers.
Under this analysis, a case like Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association 25 might or might not come out the same way,
but the Court's reasoning would be very different. Lyng involved an
unsuccessful attempt by Native Americans to challenge the
construction of a road on government land because of its impact on
sacred sites they used for religious activities. In rejecting this free
exercise claim, the Court discussed the problems intrinsic with giving
a religious group significant control over the use government might
make of public property.252 Much of the Court's analysis, however,
focused on the distinction between government prohibiting or
penalizing religious practices and government rendering religious
practices impractical or impossible. Only prohibitions and penalties,
the Court explained, can be challenged as free exercise violations.
Burdens that make it otherwise impossible to practice one's faith do
not abridge free exercise rights.253 In the majority opinion in Lyng, it
is not only the location where free exercise rights occur that is
m To a significant extent, the difference between the special status of religion in the home
or house of worship and the less privileged position it receives in the public square reflects the
exclusivity of the former environment and the diversity of the latter. In this sense, the public
square is secularized, but as Marci Hamilton notes, "it is not anti-religious secularism. It is a
secularism that invites in all religious faiths .... '[t]he mark of secularization [is] the fact that
participants in a given discursive practice are not in a position to take for granted that their
interlocutors are making the same religious assumptions they are."' Marci A. Hamilton, What
Does "Religion" Mean in the Public Square?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1153, 1161 (2005) (reviewing
JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY & TRADITION (2004)) (quoting STOUT, supra, at 97).
251485 U.S. 439 (1988).
252 Id. at 452-53.
253 Id. at 448.
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important to the Court's conclusion, but also the nature of the burden
on religious liberty that is emphasized and devalued.
The decision in Lyng received considerable criticism because of
the breadth of its reasoning and the one-sided analysis the Court em-
ployed,254 and deservedly so. According to the Court, certain kinds of
burdens on the exercise of religion-those that render religious prac-
tices impossible to perform-are placed entirely beyond the coverage
of the First Amendment. Any state interest, no matter how trivial, can
sustain these kinds of burdens on religious conduct--even if the state
could easily further its goals through less restrictive alternatives.
The Court's concern that the free exercise claim in Lyng involves
the way that government uses its own land provides a much more
persuasive basis for resolving the case. While a focus on the location
of religious practices on public property might reasonably reduce the
level of scrutiny the court applies to a free exercise dispute, it should
not preclude any meaningful review. As is true for speech regulations
that limit expressive activities on most public property, courts may
engage in a less demanding evaluation of the state's justification for
its action in these cases-without deferring completely to the gov-
ernment's decision.255 A sufficiently weak state interest ought not to
outweigh free exercise rights even on government property.
In addition to concerns about interference with the use to which
public property is put, there is another reason why free exercise
claims involving religious activities on public property should be
distinguished from other cases and adjudicated under a less
demanding standard of review. The problem here relates to a common
characteristic of religion-its exclusionary nature. While religion
strengthens interpersonal bonds among the members of a
congregation or religious community, it may often separate people of
one faith from adherents of other religions, or nonbelievers. Much of
the time, the divisions that result from congregational commitments
to different beliefs are not problematic. Lutherans do not feel
burdened when their Jewish neighbors attend a nearby Synagogue on
254See generally BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW AND THE LAND: NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED LAND (1999); Robert S. Michael-
sen, Is the Miner's Canary Silent? Implications of the Supreme Court's Denial of American
Indian Free Exercise of Religion Claims, 6 J. L & RELIGION 97 (1988); Robert J. Miller, Cor-
recting Supreme Court "Errors": American Indian Response to Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, 20 ENvTL. L. 1037, 1037 (1990); Joshua D. Rievman, Judi-
cial Scrutiny of Native American Free Exercise Rights: Lyng and the Decline of the Yoder
Doctrine, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 169, 170-71 (1989).
5 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text regarding the deferential standard of
review applied to speech regulations in nonpublic forums.
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Saturday, and Jews experience no discomfort when the Lutherans in
town attend their church on Sunday. The obvious reality that the
services at the Synagogue are designed for Jewish worship and the
services at the Lutheran Church are grounded on Lutheran beliefs
creates no friction and undermines no one's interests or status.
That equanimity toward exclusive associations dissipates quickly
when religiously exclusionary programs take place on public
property. One problem, of course, involves perceptions of state
endorsement. Exempting the religious activities of specific faiths
from general regulations that restrict the use of public property risks
creating an imprimatur of state support for those religions.256 Another
issue involves opportunities for access.
Put simply, accommodating members of one religious faith by
providing them special access to public property may have the effect
of precluding the use of the property in question for people of other
faiths. 257 Reserving the city's baseball fields for Little League games
on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons, on its face at least, has a limited
preclusive effect since the Little League is open to boys of all races,
religions, and ethnic backgrounds. Reserving the same fields for the
same days and times for the local Christian Youth League (a hypo-
thetical group that restricts membership based on religious belief)
means that non-Christians will be denied access to the fields during
these periods.
This problem may arise out of a free exercise claim (although it
may also be the consequence of a discretionary legislative accommo-
dation). Assume the city in question has a policy or ordinance that
provides non-profit organizations preferred or subsidized access to
municipal property as long as the organizations do not discriminate
on the basis of race, religion, or other listed characteristics. A reli-
gious organization that discriminates on the basis of religion is denied
256See generally Brownstein, supra note 16, at 531-37; Steven G. Gey, The No Religion
Zone: Constitutional Limitations on Religious Association in the Public Sphere, 85 Minn. L.
Rev. 1885 (2001).
257 Of course, religion is not the only belief system based activity that has exclusionary
consequences. Political expressive activities on public property may limit access in certain
circumstances as well. Civil rights organizations holding a rally in front of city hall need not
allow racist speakers a place at the podium. But events such as political rallies are typically
sporadic in nature. Further, political commitments rarely fragment conventional social activities.
One would not expect to see a Democratic or Republican youth recreational league in a commu-
nity, for example. Thus, the exclusionary consequences of accommodating political groups that
seek access to public property are more limited and less problematic. Religion is different.
Religious activities often occur on a regular basis and religion may pervade a broad range of
associational activities. Thus, in practical terms, religious accommodations risk greater fragmen-
tation than political accommodations.
[Vol. 57:1
TAKING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
the benefits of the ordinance. It sues the city under the Free Exercise
Clause and seeks an exemption from the terms of the ordinance.
Litigation somewhat similar to this hypothetical 2 8 arose in Cali-
fornia. In Evans v. City of Berkeley,259 the Sea Scouts, a group affili-
ated with the Boy Scouts, were denied a rent-free berth at a city
owned marina because they could not comply with city policy, which
forbid the use of city funds to subsidize access to city property to
groups discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or other suspect
characteristics. The Scouts challenged the city's decision on freedom
of speech and association grounds. Presumably, they did not assert
free exercise claims because, under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause
provides no protection against neutral laws of general applicability,
such as an anti-discrimination policy.26" The California Supreme
Court recently rejected the Scouts' speech and association claims. 26'
Under the more expansive understanding of free exercise require-
ments suggested by this article, the courts could not avoid the free
exercise issue posed by this case entirely as they can and must under
the Smith regime. Instead of emphasizing the generality of the regula-
tion, they would apply a more lenient standard of review to free exer-
cise claims challenging the state's use of public property. Given the
state's compelling interest in not subsidizing discriminatory conduct
on public property, the ultimate result might still be the same, and the
claim for a free exercise exemption denied, but the reasoning em-
ployed would have a very different focus.
25 A related dispute is being litigated in San Diego based on long-term leases to public
park land between the city and the Boy Scouts. Plaintiffs claim the leases constitute subsidies to
the Boy Scouts and provide them preferential access to public property. Since the Scouts restrict
their membership on the basis of religion (atheists and agnostics can not be members), plaintiffs
argue that the leases violate the Establishment Clause. San Diego and the Scouts disputed the
Establishment Clause argument, of course. Further, they argued that terminating the existing
leases would violate the Boy Scouts freedom of speech and freedom of association rights.
The district court ruled against the Scouts in Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of Am., 275 F.
Supp. 2d. 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2003). Rather than appeal the district court's decision, San Diego
accepted it and terminated the leases with the Scouts. The Scouts, in turn, are challenging San
Diego's actions.
While the San Diego litigation is not exactly on point, it is not difficult to imagine cases
where leases are denied to religious organizations because they discriminate on the basis of
suspect characteristics and where the organizations claim that such denials constitute a violation
of their free exercise rights.
259 129 P.3d 394 (Cal. 2006).
26°If the Sea Scouts could demonstrate that Berkeley's policy discriminated against reli-
gious groups, they could assert a free exercise claim. There would be little utility in doing so,
however, since such a discriminatory policy would constitute prohibited viewpoint discrimina-
tion and would violate the free speech clause in any case.261 See Evans, 129 P.3d at 400-08.
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4. The Misplaced Notion of Hybrid Rights
The Smith decision is not entirely barren of free exercise distinc-
tions. It provides two exceptions to its general rule that limits free
exercise claims to only those situations in which the state singles out
religion or a specific faith for unfavorable treatment or restrictions.
One exception suggests that courts may rigorously review general
laws that substantially burden the exercise of religion if some other
right, such as freedom of speech or association, is also burdened by
the challenged law.262 The other exception involves situations when
the state acts through "individualized governmental assessment[s]"
and has in place "a system of individualized exemptions" that it uses
in enforcing its laws.263
I have explained in a previous article why the former exception
dealing with so-called "hybrid rights" does not warrant distinctive
treatment, and that the latter exception focusing on individualized
assessments, while grounded on legitimate concerns, is too limited in
its scope to accomplish much in the way of doctrinal development.2 4
Ordinarily, if my only response to these exceptions was to point out
their lack of utility for developing free exercise doctrine, I would not
discuss them further here and would simply refer readers to my earlier
work. But the problem with "hybrid rights" is not only that it makes
little sense and fails to provide a persuasive basis for increasing the
protection religious liberty receives. A hybrid rights analysis actually
points courts in the wrong direction. Hybrid rights situations should
not receive rigorous review. These are circumstances when the
rigorous review of laws burdening religious exercise is uniquely
inappropriate.
Put simply, a hybrid rights analysis suggests that when religious
individuals exercise rights like freedom of speech, they should
receive greater protection for their religiously motivated expressive
activities than non-religious individuals receive. That contention flies
in the face of one of the most basic foundations of American
constitutional law-the principle that all citizens are equal with
regard to their exercise of fundamental rights. The idea of equal rights
is emphatically the controlling rule when the rights under discussion
serve instrumental goals and have an obvious equality dimension to
them- as is the case with voting rights, freedom of speech, and
freedom of association. But a similar commitment to equality applies
262See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
263 Id. at 884 (1990); see supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
2 False Messiahs, supra note 19, at 187-203.
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to dignitary rights as well, such as the right to marry or to have
children, because equality of treatment with regard to these kinds of
personal decisions is intrinsic to our conception of human dignity.265
Moreover, it is particularly unacceptable to privilege religion or
particular faiths with regard to the exercise of rights. As noted earlier,
one of the problems courts confront when they are asked to recognize
free exercise exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability is
that granting such accommodations may provide religious individuals
material benefits that are unavailable to citizens holding different
beliefs. Developing a framework to reduce or mitigate the material
advantages that accrue to religious individuals when their right to
practice their faith is protected is an important step in legitimizing
such exemptions.2 6
The severity of this problem is magnified substantially when the
benefit religious individuals receive from exemptions involves greater
freedom to exercise the most fundamental rights available to citizens.
Not only do these advantages implicate core values of the polity, they
are also much more difficult to measure and to mitigate. It is one
thing to assign some monetary value to a public employee being
granted Saturday or Sunday off. It is another thing to ask courts to
place a price on the freedom to be exempt from speech regulations
that other citizens must obey. Thus, if a petitioner seeks a free
exercise exemption from a law that burdens the exercise of another
fundamental right, as well as freedom of religion, courts should
presumptively reject the claim. All citizens have an equal claim to
protection of their fundamental rights. If restrictions on the exercise
of a right are valid when they are applied to conduct that is not
religiously motivated, they should be equally valid when applied to
religiously motivated exercises of the right as well.
CONCLUSION
No sensible person would suggest that developing a careful, nu-
anced, free exercise jurisprudence would be easy. But there is an ex-
traordinarily large gap between something that is difficult to do and
something that is impossible to do. Today, the current empty state of
free exercise doctrine suggests that most jurists and scholars have
thrown up their hands and concluded that nothing meaningful can be
done in this area of constitutional law. It is apparent that many view
2 5Id. at 187-93.
2m See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
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religious liberty as a right that is simply not susceptible to serious
constitutional protection.
This article attempts to challenge that orthodoxy by suggesting
ways to begin filling the gap with doctrinal substance. Or perhaps, to
state the project more accurately, it is an attempt to begin thinking
about what a serious free exercise jurisprudence might look like.
Clearly, there are some unique challenges to developing a frame-
work for adjudicating free exercise claims. Part of this article attempts
to respond to these specific concerns. The problem of privileging, for
example, is much less of a problem for other rights than it is for reli-
gious liberty. For the most part, we do not consider freedom of speech
to privilege those who speak over those who remain silent because
expression has so much importance and utility for everyone, and be-
cause we do not see a conflict between those who exercise this right
and those who do not. Religion is different. Further, the protection
speech receives seldom provides speakers material advantages un-
available to others. Accordingly, the development of free exercise
doctrine has to respond to this distinct problem, and I have suggested
ways to try to take this concern into account.
Other issues are more endemic to the protection of rights gener-
ally. The problems intrinsic to balancing rights against state interests,
such as judicial subjectivity and indeterminacy of results, pervade
fundamental rights doctrine. Here, analogies to free speech and equal
protection case law provide something of a template for beginning an
inquiry. Why, we may ask, does location matter so much for free
speech purposes? And do the reasons for taking the location where
speech occurs so seriously help to provide us comparable rationales
for distinguishing some free exercise contexts from others?
The core of the conclusion to this article is that the article really
has no conclusion. It is the beginning of an inquiry, a preliminary
sketch of questions that ought to be asked. It cannot supply complete
answers to the problems presented. Ultimately, it is an invitation to
take free exercise rights seriously and to think about what that means.
No more, no less.
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